Essays on Bank Risk by Sclip, Alex
	 
Corso di dottorato di ricerca in Scienze Manageriali e 
Attuariali 
 
in convenzione con Università degli studi di Trieste 
 
 
Ciclo XXX 
 
 
 
 
Titolo della tesi 
 
Essays on Bank Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dottorando     Supervisore 
 
Sclip Alex      Prof. Stefano Miani 
      
 
 
 
Anno 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Abstract 
 
This thesis comprises research on banks’ risk. The work is presented in three empirical essays.  
The first essay investigates the relationship between bank capital and liquidity and the impact 
of those connections on the market probability of default. Using quarterly balance sheet data of large 
European banks over the period 2005-2015 and various configurations of capital and liquidity; we 
first analyse through a simultaneous equation model the connections between capital and liquidity. 
The results of the model show a bidirectional positive relationship between capital and funding 
liquidity risk in line with the “financial fragility” and the “crowding out of deposits” hypotheses 
developed in theoretical papers. The results also indicate the importance of off-balance sheet 
exposures and the limitation of risk based capital ratios in explaining the relationship. Given the 
importance of capital and liquidity for financial stability, in the second part of the paper we explore 
whether those variables provide incremental information on banks’ risk. To do so, we use a factor 
model to analyse if leverage and funding liquidity risk are reflected in CDS spreads. We find that 
capital appears to have a large impact on CDS spread changes, while liquidity risk is priced only 
when it falls below the regulatory threshold.  
The second essay examines the causal effect of bank credit rating changes on bank capital 
structure decisions. In this paper, we hypothesize that bank managers’ concern for credit ratings due 
to the discrete cost and benefits associated with different credit levels. Using a unique data set with 
quarterly detailed information on rating changes and bank’s balance sheets for 76 banks based in EU 
and US from 2005Q1 to 2015Q4, we find that rating changes matter for bank capital structure 
decisions. More precisely, we find that a downgrade event triggers reductions in leverage, long-term 
funding and lending. While upgrades do not cause capital structure adjustments. In doing our 
empirical exercise, we also exploit the asymmetric impact of rating changes of banks based in 
countries that experienced the sovereign debt crisis. This asymmetric effect leads to greater: capital 
adjustments, reductions in long-term funding and lending of banks from those stressed countries.  
The third essay examines how bank risks affects the transmission mechanism of 
unconventional monetary policy measures taken by the Federal Reserve (FED) in response to the 
financial crisis. Using quarterly balance sheet data and employing a GMM approach, for a sample of 
149 US banks over the period 2007 to 2016, I find that bank risk positions are relevant for the 
transmission mechanism through the bank lending channel during the FED Quantitative easing (QE) 
programmes. The empirical findings suggest that QE programs helped banks to supply new loans 
through the reduction of bank risk conditions, as perceived by financial market investors.  
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The research works of my thesis contributes to the knowledge of banks’ risk and provide 
several policy implications related to the recent discussions of how to redesign regulation of the 
banking sector.  
The first paper provides three main policy implications. Firstly, our results cast doubts on the 
accuracy of Basel II capital formulations and support the efforts of the Basel Committee to revise the 
leverage requirements of the banking sector. Secondly, we highlight the importance of implementing 
minimum liquidity ratios concomitant with leverage ratios, as we shown that capital and liquidity are 
closely related to each other. Thirdly, we provide evidence that prices in the CDS market incorporates 
promptly information on leverage and funding liquidity risk. Therefore, supervisors might exercise 
indirect market discipline through the monitoring of such derivatives.    
In the second paper, we demonstrate the importance of bank credit ratings for capital structure 
decisions. Our results demonstrate that credit ratings changes have economic and decision-making 
consequences for banks. Moreover, we also show that deteriorating sovereign credit quality has an 
impact even for healthy banks. Based on our results, we call for a rethinking on the role of credit 
rating agencies in the context of regulation and supervisory schemes.  
Finally, the last paper provides some policy implications on the way monetary policy was 
conducted in the U.S.. In particular, the results suggest that the impact of unconventional monetary 
policy actions can be amplified or attenuated by changes in the investors’ perception of risk of the 
banking sector. This  result call for a further close coordination between monetary policy and 
supervisory activities within central banks, with the aim of increasing the efficiency and stability of 
the entire financial sector.   
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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the interrelations between bank capital and liquidity and their impact on the 
market probability of default. We employ an unbalanced panel of large EU banks with listed CDS 
contracts during the period 2005-2015, which allow us to consider the impact of the recent financial 
crisis. Our evidence suggests that bank capital and funding liquidity risk as defined in Basel III have 
an economically meaningful bidirectional relationship. However, the effect on CDS spread is 
ambiguous. While capital has a large impact on CDS spread changes, liquidity risk is priced only 
when it falls below the regulatory threshold.  
 
Keywords: Bank capital, liquidity, CDS spreads.  
 
                                                
1 We are grateful for comments and feedbacks received from Federico Beltrame, Alberto Dreassi, Giacomo Nocera, 
Andrea Paltrinieri, John O.S. Wilson, as well as participants of seminars at the St. Andrew University, the IRMC 2017 
conference in Florence and the 2017 European FMA Conference in Lisbon.   
 4 
1.Introduction 
 
In normal times, asset markets are buoyant and funding is readily and cheaply available.  The 
rapid changes in market conditions in the second half of the 2000s and the financial crisis that 
followed have shown that liquidity can dry up very quickly and that it can take a long time to come 
back. Many large banks in the US and Europe, experienced financial difficulties despite meeting the 
existing regulatory capital requirements because they did not prudently manage their liquidity. With 
greater liquidity and maturity transformation risk, central banks had to take action both in money 
markets and individual institutions. Eventually, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) proposed two standards for liquidity risk and a revision of capital requirements2 emphasising 
the importance of solvency requirements in conjunction with liquidity creation. In practice, however, 
the causal relationship between capital and liquidity discussed in theoretical papers (Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983; Diamond and Rajan, 2000) and inferred in BCBS statements (BCBS, 2010a), is far 
from straightforward and might be jointly determined.  
The traditional role of banks is to perform maturity transformation. This contributes to 
efficient resource allocation and credit creation. However, while banks holding riskier assets should 
strengthen their capital to face unexpected losses from selling some assets at fire-sale prices, banks 
relying on a higher proportion of unstable funding sources for their activities, may need to hold more 
liquid assets to deal with liquidity risk. The problem is that banks have weak private incentives to 
limit excessive reliance on unstable funding of core (often illiquid) assets. Banks may also have 
private incentives to increase leverage, and to expand their balance sheets relying on relatively cheap 
and abundant short-term wholesale funding. Rapid balance sheet growth can weaken the ability of 
individual banks to respond to liquidity, as well as solvency, shocks, and can have systemic 
implications when banks fail to internalise the costs associated with large funding gaps. A highly 
interconnected financial system tends to exacerbate these spillovers.  
The financial crisis has demonstrated the instability that can result from banks having 
insufficient financial resources in terms of capital or liquidity. It has also highlighted the need to 
develop models and market indicators that could help identify the possible weaknesses of large 
banking institutions in terms of capital and liquidity that can trigger systemic risk to the entire 
financial system. Capital and liquidity may provide incremental information about the banks’ credit 
risk (Chiaramonte and Casu, 2016; Vazquez and Federico, 2015) and CDS spreads seem ideal 
because they give a direct measure of banks’ default risk.  In particular, CDSs may be considered a 
timely indicator of credit risk arising from insufficient resources of capital and liquidity. 
                                                
2 For detailed information on the new regulatory requirements, refers to BCBS (2009; 2010a; 2010b). 
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This paper contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, to best of our knowledge, 
it is the first study to provide an empirical investigation of the simultaneous interrelation between 
capital and liquidity in European banks and to extend the analysis to the impact of these variables on 
CDS spread changes. Published studies typically focus either on the interrelations between capital 
and liquidity (e.g., Distinguin et al., 2013) or on the determinants of CDS spread changes (Casu and 
Chiaramonte, 2011; Hasan et al., 2015). 
Second, we employ a sample of large banks operating in the euro area over 2005-2015 thereby 
allowing us to consider the impact of both the global financial crisis and the euro sovereign debt 
crisis. We focus on large banks because they account for roughly 90% of aggregate bank liquidity, 
they typically have an easier access to the lender-of-last resort function and would be first to benefit 
from safety nets, as noted in Distinguin et al. (2013). As far as we are aware, no other published 
studies conducted an empirical investigation on the relationship between capital and liquidity in the 
context of the crisis. For example, Distinguin et al. (2013) analyses the period before the financial 
crisis: 2000-2006; Hovarth et al. (2012) uses a sample of Czech banks from 2000 to 2010. In addition, 
while existing studies employ yearly on-balance sheet data, in our paper we rely on quarterly data 
and we also consider large banks’ off-balance sheet exposures which have previously been found as 
important determinants of liquidity risk management (Ippolito et al., 2016). 
Third, we extend the literature in several directions. This paper analyses the relationship 
between capital and liquidity in a way consistent with the formulations of the most recent 
international regulatory framework for banks (Basel III). In particular, we use two different 
configurations of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) as a measure of illiquidity and three classes 
of formulations of capital: the leverage ratio defined in Basel III, the risk-weight capital ratios defined 
in Basel II and a market-based measure of capital. Once we examine the complex interrelations 
between capital and liquidity, we add to the literature by providing in the second part of the analysis 
an empirical test to identify whether and to what extent market participants in the derivative (CDS) 
markets incorporate information on capital and liquidity into CDS spreads. It is expected that if 
investors exercised market discipline in the banking sector through the assessment of bank risk 
profiles into CDS spreads, supervisors should detect the weaknesses that can arise from banks having 
insufficient resources in terms of capital and liquidity indirectly, through the monitoring of the 
derivative market. We focus on the CDS market because participation is dominated by institutional 
investors that tend to be better informed and equipped to monitor the risk profile of a bank than other 
investors. Volz and Wedow (2011) note that investors exercise market discipline in the CDS market, 
as they find that prices are positively correlated with banks’ risks. We expect capital and liquidity to 
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correlate negatively with the bank CDS spreads as banks that are more capitalised and more liquid 
will have lower credit risk. 
Finally, we add to the literature on the usefulness of CDS spreads in capturing bank risk 
positions. In particular, we add to the previous works by Hasan et al. (2015) and Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2016) on the applicability of market-based variables and accounting-based bank fundamentals to 
explain CDS spread changes. The accounting information used in those studies is mostly based on 
CAMEL3 indicators in which only asset liquidity is considered. In our paper, we cover this gap as we 
use a large set of accounting variables and proxies for funding liquidity risk. Moreover, to the best of 
our knowledge works on CDS spread determinants do not include the effects of the sovereign debt 
crisis.  
Our evidence suggests a bidirectional positive relationship between capital and liquidity, 
thereby supporting both the “financial fragility” and the “crowding out of deposits” hypotheses 
developed in theory (for more details see Section 2.1). Our evidence also confirms the ability of CDS 
spreads as a timely indicator of bank risk that can be used by regulators in early warning systems to 
monitor bank weaknesses. More specifically, we find that capital is an important determinant of CDS 
spread changes. However, funding liquidity risk is a determinant of CDS spread changes when it is 
above the minimum regulatory threshold and through the interaction with capital ratios.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the main literature on 
the relationship between liquidity risk and capital and on the determinants of CDS spread changes in 
the banking sector. Section 3 describes the dataset and the variables included in the empirical analysis. 
Section 4 presents the methodology. Section 5 discusses the results. In section 6 we perform a battery 
of robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
In our paper we link two strands of literature: the theories linking bank liquidity to capital 
(Section 2.1) and studies concerned in analysing the CDS spreads determinants of the banking sector 
(Section 2.2).  
 
2.1 The relationship between liquidity and capital in banks 
Several theoretical papers deal with the relationship between bank capital and liquidity 
creation. The theoretical discussion on this relationship has led to two main contrasting hypotheses: 
the “financial fragility/crowding-out of deposits” hypothesis and the “risk absorption” hypothesis. 
                                                
3 Camel rating system is supervisory rating system developed in the U.S. The acronym CAMEL stands for: Capital 
adequacy (C), Asset quality (A), Management quality (M), Earnings potential (E), Liquidity (L). 
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The former predicts that higher capital reduces liquidity creation. The financial fragility theory of 
Diamond et al. (2000; 2001), model a relationship bank that raises funds from investors to provide 
financing to an entrepreneur. In this model deposits are fragile and prone to runs. Increased 
uncertainty makes deposits excessively fragile and creates a role for bank capital. The quantity of 
capital reduces the probability of financial distress but hampers the benefits of liquidity creation of a 
bank. Thus, banks have to set the optimum level of capital that trades off the benefits of liquidity 
creation and the cost of distress. Moreover, Gorton and Winton (2000) develops the “crowding-out 
of deposits” hypothesis. The authors affirm that deposits are more effective liquidity hedges for 
investors than investments in equity capital. Higher capital ratios shift investors’ funds from deposits 
to bank capital. Since deposits are liquid and bank capital is illiquid, there is an overall reduction of 
liquidity when capital is higher.  
 
The alternative risk absorption hypothesis, which is directly linked with the risk-
transformation role of banks, affirms that higher capital ratios enhance banks’ ability to create 
liquidity. According to the theory: liquidity creation entails a risk. The more liquidity is created the 
greater is the likelihood and severity of losses associated with the transformation of short-term 
deposits into long-term illiquid assets. Since the role of capital is to absorb risk and expand banks’ 
risk-bearing capacity, higher capital ratios enhance the ability of banks to create liquidity 
(Bhattacharya et al., 1993; Allen et al. 2004; among others).  
 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) empirically test theories of the relationship between capital and 
liquidity creation. Using a sample of US banks during the period spanning 1993 to 2003, the authors 
develop a liquidity creation measure and investigate the effect of bank capital on liquidity creation. 
Their empirical results support both theories on the relationship between capital and liquidity. More 
precisely, they find that the relationship is positive for large banks when the liquidity creation measure 
considers off-balance sheet items and not significant when liquidity creation measure account only 
on balance sheet activities. The relationship is negative and significant for small banks using both 
liquidity creation measures.  
 
Distinguin et al. (2013) by considering a sample of US and European publicly traded banks 
over the 2000-2006 period, analyse the impact of bank liquidity, measured on balance sheet items, 
on regulatory capital ratios. The results of the study suggest that banks decrease their regulatory 
capital when they create more liquidity or when they face higher illiquidity as defined in Basel III. 
Thus following the authors, capital is negatively related to bank liquidity creation.   
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However, the “financial fragility” hypothesis depends on the deposit insurance coverage. If insurance 
were complete, depositors would have no incentive to run on the bank in situations of uncertainty. 
Fungacova et al. (2010) empirically test how the introduction of deposit insurance affects the 
relationship between capital and liquidity. They find that the implementation of deposit insurance has 
a limited impact on the negative relationship between capital and liquidity creation.   
 
On the empirical point of view, the causal relationship between capital and liquidity is difficult 
to grasp because it may be jointly determined. Hovarth et al. (2012) analyse the possible bi-causal 
relationship by employing a Granger causality test in a dynamic GMM panel estimator on a sample 
of Czech banks from 2000 to 2010. They show a negative relationship between capital and liquidity 
creation which confirms the financial fragility hypothesis. However, the authors observe also that 
liquidity creation Granger-causes a reduction in capital. This bi-directional negative causality 
suggests to consider the trade-off between financial stability reached by stronger capital requirements 
and the economic benefits related to liquidity creation. From a different perspective, Vazquez et al. 
(2015) and Chiaramonte et al. (2016) investigate the evolution of bank liquidity and leverage and 
their implications for financial stability. Vazquez et al. (2015) show the complementary nature of 
liquidity and capital in explaining bank fragility. The authors also find evidence of differences across 
bank size. More precisely, the smaller the bank the more inclined to fail on liquidity risk, while large 
banks are more inclined to fail due to insufficient capital buffers. While Chiaramonte et al. (2016), 
by analysing a sample of banks headquartered in Europe, argue that capital and liquidity plays a 
complementary role only for large banks, while for all banks the only significant determinant of bank 
failure is the Basel III structural liquidity ratio, which measures the mismatch in bank balance sheet.  
The impact of regulatory intervention during crisis periods may also change the liquidity 
creation and risk-taking behaviour of banks. Berger et al. (2016) analyse the impact of regulatory 
interventions on bank liquidity creation. Using a dataset on 278 German banks over the period 1999-
2009, the authors find that regulatory interventions and capital support reduce liquidity creation and 
bank risk taking.  
Based on the empirical results of the papers discussed above, our hypothesis for the 
relationship between bank capital and liquidity are the following:  
 
H1: Along the time span considered, which covers the financial and the sovereign debt crisis, 
the relationship between capital and liquidity is negative for large European banks.  
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Based on the presented literature, the hypothesis is disputed in both the theoretical and the 
empirical literature. On the theoretical point of view, the “financial fragility/crowding out of deposits” 
hypotheses seem to fit better on small banks. Larger capital markets are often quite segmented 
implying that a shift in bank deposits have a smaller impact on investor demand of equity and 
deposits. Therefore, the relationship between capital and liquidity creation should be positive for large 
banks as empirically demonstrated by Berger et al. (2009).  In contrast, Distinguin et al. (2013) and 
Hovarth et al. (2012) claim that the relationship between capital and liquidity creation should be 
negative also for large banks. In addition, Vazquez et al. (2015) and Chiaramonte et al. (2016) 
demonstrate the complementary role of liquidity and capital in explaining bank fragility. We believe 
that the financial and the sovereign debt crisis and the following regulatory interventions, pressured 
banks in considering liquidity and capital as complementary determinants. With the result, that banks 
strength their capital when facing liquidity concerns.  
 
2.2 The influence of liquidity risk and capital on CDS spread changes 
 
The leverage ratio and the higher structural mismatches in bank balance sheet have been the 
key factors in the propagation of the crisis. Therefore, the logical follow-up question then is: how 
CDS spread changes, which reflect the market probability of failure, are affected by the relationship 
between liquidity and capital.  
To derive a testable hypothesis of this question we rely on the literature explaining CDS 
spread determinants. The specifications of CDS spread models are based on the theory developed for 
corporate bond credit spread (Merton, 1974). However, structural variables have limited power in 
explaining credit spread changes (Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001). As a matter of fact, recent studies 
(Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001; Blanco et al., 2005; Ericsson et al. 2009) extends structural models by 
including some additional factors such as stock market returns and the slope of yield curve, in 
response to the so-called credit spread puzzle. Works on CDS spread determinants (Galil et al., 2014; 
Das et al., 2009; among others) generally exclude banks from the empirical investigation, due to their 
particular asset structure that exacerbates the credit spread puzzle. As a consequence, only a few 
studies are devoted on the determinants of CDS spread changes in the banking sector. Annaert et al. 
(2013) used structural variables to explain CDS spread changes of 32 listed euro area banks. The 
authors found that the determinant of CDS spread changes vary across time, so the models have to be 
re-estimated frequently. The authors also highlight the importance of market liquidity and market 
wide factors in addition of structural variables in explaining CDS spread changes.  
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Despite the popularity of market-based default metrics, the empirical literature on bank-failure 
(Cole and White, 2012; Berger et al., 2016; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Altunbas et al., 2011; among 
others) suggests that accounting information has an important role in predicting distress. Thus, a 
hybrid model using both accounting ratios and market based variables predict to a larger extent CDS 
spread changes. Hasan et al. (2015) investigate the effect of both structural variables and balance-
sheet ratios on bank CDS spreads, while controlling also for market factors. The authors find that 
balance-sheet ratios increase the explanatory power of structural variables; furthermore, they find that 
the impact of leverage and asset quality on CDS spreads is stronger during turmoil periods. 
Chiaramonte et al. (2013) and Okter-Robe et al. (2010) find that CDS spread reflect the credit risk 
captured by some balance sheet-ratios on a sample of European banks. In a related paper, 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2016) test the relevance of accounting information and loan/securities and 
investments by type in explaining CDS spread changes. The authors find that risky ABS securities 
and real estate risk was a major risk for US bank holding companies reflected in CDS spread changes. 
Liu et al. (2015), while controlling for structural variables and accounting indicators, find that deposit 
insurance has an adverse effect on Bank CDS spreads. They also demonstrate that the adverse effect 
of deposit insurance is greater when banks have poor asset quality and liquidity.  
All the previous mentioned studies provide evidence that leverage plays a pivotal role over 
the stability of a banks, but largely ignore liquidity risk and off-balance sheet exposure. Although 
studies focused on CDS spread changes include proxies for liquidity, they mostly focus on CAMEL4-
based asset side liquidity or the general funding liquidity. Maturity transformation risk is largely 
ignored, just as off-balance sheet exposures which are important determinants of banks liquidity and 
leverage respectively. Moreover, the joint relationship between liquidity risk and leverage is also 
ignored. Therefore, by taking in consideration these components we are able to extend the literature 
on banks CDS spread determinants. Paring these results with the findings of bank default studies, 
showing that capital and liquidity risk posed a serious threat to bank probability of failure 
(Chiaramonte et al. 2016; Vazquez et al., 2015), leads us to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The interplay between capital and liquidity contribute to CDS spread changes.   
 
Based on the empirical evidence presented above, we believe that the empirical investigation 
of CDS spread determinants during the recent crisis might provide support for the hypothesis.  
 
                                                
4 Camel rating system is supervisory rating system developed in the U.S. The acronym CAMEL stands for: Capital 
adequacy (C), Asset quality (A), Management quality (M), Earnings potential (E), Liquidity (L). 
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3. Data and descriptive statistics  
3.1 Data and sample selection 
 
Our sample consist of Euro area banks for which CDS contracts are listed. The selection of 
the banks is driven by the availability of data on CDS quotes on Bloomberg Professional Service5. 
We obtain CDS spread series on 5-year senior debt contracts for 38 banks at quarterly frequencies 
over the years 2005-2015. Table (1) lists the bank included in our study. To ensure that CDS spread 
changes reflect meaningful information on bank credit risk, we impose strict liquidity criteria.  More 
precisely, we retain only CDS spread changes during a certain quarter only if at least 80% of 
observations are non-zero during the quarter.  
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
 
We gather quarterly balance sheet data from Bloomberg financial service, while 
macroeconomic data is from the World Bank Database. Table (2) show the descriptive statistics of 
all the variables used in this study.  
The decision to focus on CDS spreads had a decisive impact on sample size, given that only 
a limited number of banks have listed CDS contracts. However, the possibility of rely on quarterly 
data rather than annual data make available a higher number of observations for our analysis.  
 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
3.2 Capital and liquidity risk proxy variables 
The target variables of our analysis are capital ratios and liquidity proxies defined in Basel 
III. Capital requirements are usually set as a proportion of risk weighted assets. The Basel II total 
regulatory capital ratio is defined as the sum of the core (Tier 1) and the supplementary (Tier 2) 
capital on risk weighted assets. The supplementary capital contains hybrid instruments, therefore for 
deeper inside we consider the total common equity tier 1 (CET 1), which is the ratio of total 
shareholder funds on risk weighted assets. However, the risk weighted calculation under Basel II 
rules might not reflect the actual risk. Capital measures based on non-risk weight assets may have 
been considered as more meaningful for stock participants (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013a) and good 
predictors of bank failure (Lev and Huang, 2009). In line with these studies and with the new Basel 
                                                
5 Bloomberg relies on Credit market analysis (CMA) for pricing credit derivatives. CMA receives quotes for credit 
instruments from 30 buy-side firms, including major investment banks, hedge funds and asset managers.  
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III regulation, we measure bank capital as the ratio of equity to total assets. Moreover, large banks 
might increase their risk exposure through the management of their off-balance sheet items, in order 
to take in consideration this effect, we add another measure of leverage defined as the ratio of equity 
to total assets and off-balance sheet exposures, in line with the Basel III leverage ratio. Regulatory 
capital formulations refer to measures of capital at book value, however banks could base their 
liquidity risk management practices also on market measures of capital.  For example, banks might 
target a market value of capital below which the bond market starts charging a risk premium. Or they 
might target both book and market value of equity needed to pursue future acquisition strategies. For 
this reason, we include also the ratio of market capitalization to total market value.  
The banking literature as developed some synthetic liquidity indicators that attempt to grasp 
the liquidity of bank assets and liabilities (Deep and Schaefer, 2004; Berger and Bouwman, 2009; 
BIS, 2009). The liquidity creation measure developed by Berger and Bouwman (2009) is closely 
related to the regulatory measure of funding stability. Both indicators try to capture the portion of 
illiquid assets financed with short-term funding, moreover both are measured giving a weight of the 
balance sheet items depending on their stability. Since, we would measure liquidity in a way 
consistent with Basel III, we rely on the NSFR. The NSFR is the defined as the ratio of available 
stable funding to required stable funding. More precisely, the NSFR is a ratio between the weighted 
sum of the different type of liabilities (Li) and assets (AJ):  
 !"#$ = 	 '()(('*+** 		(1) 
 
The weights ,- are defined by the Basel committee and reflect the stability of the balance 
sheet components. In 2014 the committee as issued a revision of the weights of the NSFR previously 
defined in the 2010 version. Due to the evolving nature of the Basel III liquidity standard we calculate 
two versions: NSFR 2014 based on the last technical document (BCBS, 2014) and NSFR 2010 based 
on the original document (BCBS, 2010b). The necessary granularity of the bank assets and liabilities 
to calculate the NSFR is not provided in Bloomberg professional service. In particular, we cannot 
split the loan portfolios according to their maturity and types, which under Basel III entails different 
weights. Following a conservative approach, we require that the portfolio of loans requires an overall 
weight of 0.85. Furthermore, we cannot split securities in government bonds and other securities, 
thus, following a conservative approach, we use a weight of 0.5, which is within the weight proposed 
in Basel III for other securities items. The description of each capital and liquidity proxy variable 
with its calculation is provided in Table (3).  
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[Insert table 3 about here] 
 
4 Empirical methodology  
4.1 The relationship between liquidity risk and capital Econometric Methodology  
 
We first analyse the relationship between liquidity and capital using the set of proxy variables 
defined in the previous section. This analysis investigates the contribution of liquidity in explaining 
bank capital ratios. Berger and Bouwman (2009) and Distinguin et al. (2013) claim that bank capital 
might also be a determinant of bank liquidity creation. For example, it is sure that requiring a bank 
to hold more high-quality liquid assets make it safer and less need of capital. To deal with simultaneity 
that create endogeneity concerns, we use a simultaneous equation model as in Distinguin et al. (2013).  
In the first equation, we regress alternatively the different formulations of capital on a set of 
bank specific and macroeconomic factors, to which we add liquidity measures. In the second 
equation, we regress the two liquidity formulations on a set of independent variables representative 
of: bank specific factors, the macroeconomic environment and the European Central Bank policies. 
We employ a simultaneous equations model, where the system of equations is estimated via GMM:  
 
./012/3-,5 = 6-,5 + 891:;1<12=-,5 + >?@.?-,5ABC?DB + >EF@.E-,5AB + G-,5
H
EDB91:;1<12=-,5 = I-,5 + J./012/3-,5 + KL@9L-,5ABMLDB + KEF@9N-,5AB + O-,5PNDB
	(1) 
 ./012/3 and 91:;1<12= correspond respectively to the capital and liquidity proxies. @.?-,5 and @9L-,5 are the kth and the mth exogenous determinants of capital and liquidity.  @.E-,5 and @9N-,5 are 
the mth 
and the nth endogenous determinants of capital and liquidity6. The equations of the system (1) 
are estimated simultaneously controlling for the endogeneity of the independent variables in a GMM 
approach. The GMM estimation method has two advantages compared to the two-stage least squares: 
it is robust to the distribution of errors and it accounts for heteroskedasticity of errors. Moreover, as 
shown by Arrellano et al. (1991) and Blundell et al. (1998) the benefits of GMM estimation become 
more apparent when applied on a system of equations.  
                                                
6 Endogeneity tests are performed through the Hausman test by considering each equation of the system individually. 
Endogenous variables are replaced by their one-quarter lagged values. We replace all the bank specific variables with 
their one-quarter lagged values.  
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The selection of bank specific and macroeconomic variables of equation (1) is based on the 
literature on bank capital and liquidity. In the capital equation, we embrace the following variables: 
profitability, asset risk, bank charter value, size and the macroeconomic environment. We include 
profitability in the capital equation because raising additional capital is costly. According to the 
pecking order theory funding extra capital is the most expensive financing choice, hence it may be 
easier increase capital through retained earnings and weaker dividend payments (Flannery and Ragan, 
2008). Increase capital buffers is relatively easy when earnings are high, thus we expect a positive 
relation between profitability and capital ratios. Asset risk is also included in the capital equation. 
According to Jokipii et al. (2008), Berger et al. (2008) and Flannery et al. (2010) banks with risky 
portfolio generally hold more capital. Because bank capital can be viewed as a buffer for assuming 
losses for risky assets. The mentioned studies considered the ratio of the loan loss provision to total 
assets as proxy for banks asset risks. We expect a negative sign of the coefficient of this variable in 
the determination of bank capital. Banks with higher chartered values might raise capital more easily 
and cheaply than their peers, implying less need of capital buffers (Berger et al.; 2008). On the 
contrary, Gropp et al. (2010) suggests that bank reputation and chartered value should be protected 
by larger capital buffers. We use the ratio of market to book value as an indicator of chartered value. 
We do not have predictions of the sign of the variable in the capital regression framework. Bank size 
is included to capture size effects on bank capital ratios. According to Berger et al. (2008), large 
banks are incline to hold lower capital buffer since large banks tend to be more diversified and better 
able to manage their risky assets. On the contrary, large institutions are constrained to hold more 
capital due to their systemic relevance, hence the relationship could be negative. We use the logarithm 
of total assets as a proxy of bank size. We do not have a prediction for the sign of the coefficient of 
this variable in the capital regression. Capital buffers are also related to the economic cycle. 
According to the literature (Shim, 2013; Jokipii and Milne, 2008; 2011), bank capital is 
countercyclical. Banks tend to decrease their capital buffers during economic booms and increase 
them during economic downturns. We include the growth of real gross domestic product as a proxy 
of the business cycle. We expect a negative sign of the coefficient of this variable in the determination 
of bank capital buffers.  
In the liquidity equation, we include the following variables: size, structural funding risk, 
central bank net lending facilities and the macroeconomic environment. We introduce size in our 
liquidity regression framework because size differences among banks affect the degree of liquidity 
creation (Berger and Bouwmnan, 2009). Moreover, size could be an indicator of market power, which 
improve the ability of bank to create liquidity from their balance sheet exposures. We use the 
logarithm of total assets as a proxy for bank size. We presume a negative sign for the coefficient of 
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this variable in the determination of bank liquidity. Following Rauch et al. (2009) and Distinguin et 
al. (2013) when central bank’s policy rates decline credit supply to financial institutions increases, 
which positively affect bank liquidity. To uncover this effect, we use the ECB net lending to credit 
institutions index (TLCIECB Index). We expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this variable in 
the determination of bank liquidity. In line with Distinguin et al. (2013) we introduce a proxy variable 
for liquidity pressures in the interbank market. We consider the spread between the one-month 
interbank rate and the policy rates as a measure of liquidity pressures on the interbank market. We 
expect that higher values positively affect bank liquidity. The macroeconomic control variable for 
bank liquidity is based on Dietrich et al. (2014). In particular, as in the capital regression we include 
the growth of real gross domestic product. We expect a negative sign of the coefficient of this variable 
also in the determination of bank liquidity. Finally, we include the logarithm of CDS changes to 
control for potential changes in the management of liquidity risk and capital in times of market stress.  
Before the crisis, potential threats related to liquidity and capital were widely ignored and 
banks were incentivized to rely on short-term funding rather than more stable funding sources. After 
the crisis, lack of liquidity and capital forced them to shrink their balance sheets, which would have 
had a beneficial effect on Capital and NSFR.  
 
4.2 Factor model CDS spreads  
 
To examine the importance of the relationship between liquidity risk and capital, we ask 
whether both risks affect credit spread changes. To do so, we run a panel data fixed-effect regression 
model. Each regression uses the logarithm of quarterly CDS spreads as a dependent variable. In the 
regressions, we use alternatively all the capital and liquidity formulations considered in the study. 
Independent variables include bank structural variables, CAMELS indicators and macroeconomic 
controls. The model is as follow:  
 .@"-,5 = 	6 + 8./012/3-,5 + K91:;1<12=-,5 + 	JT-,5 + 	UVE,5 + O- + O5 + G-,5 
 
Where .@" is the natural log of CDS spread for bank i at year t; Capital and Liquidity 
identifies alternatively the five formulations of capital and the two formulations of the net stable 
funding ratio.  
Y represent a set of bank specific covariates. Z represent structural variables and country level 
controls.  O- and O5 are bank and time fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the 
bank level.  
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To select bank specific covariates, we follow Hasan et al. (2015), Chiaramonte et al. (2011), 
Okter-Robe et al. (2010) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2016). More precisely, we include the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans as a measure of asset quality, the return of total assets as a measure of 
performance, the interest income over total income and the loans to total assets as a business model 
control, the log of total assets as a measure of size. On our regression model, we also control for 
structural variables and market wide factors. In particular, we control for asset volatility using the 60 
days’ historical standard deviation of bank’s daily equity return in a particular quarter. The selection 
of this variable is based on Ericsson et al. (2009), Campbell et al. (2003) and Galil et al. (2014). To 
reduce the credit-spread puzzle we include two market wide factors, which accounts for market 
expectations and general business climate improvements. To control for market expectation about 
future conditions in the financial market, we consider the difference between the 10-year redemption 
yields and the 1-year Euribor rate. While we include the return of the Eurostoxx 600 stock index as a 
proxy of general business climate improvements. The selection of the market wide factors is based 
on Ericsson et al. (2009), Collin-Drufesne et al. (2001), Annaert et al. (2013) and Campbell et al. 
(2003).  
 
5. Results 
5.1 The relationship between capital and liquidity: Results 
To test the impact of liquidity on capital we estimate the simultaneous equation system defined 
in (1). In the capital equation, we regress several proxies of bank capital on a set of determinants 
identified in the previous section. We use alternatively three classes of formulations of capital: the 
leverage ratio defined in Basel III, the risk-weight capital ratios defined in Basel II and a market based 
measure of capital. The aim is to examine whether banks manage differently the various components 
of capital. In the liquidity equation, we regress the proxy of liquidity on a set of determinants 
described in the previous section. In this regression, we use alternatively the two configurations of 
the inverse of the Net stable funding ratio as a dependent variable. After having tested endogeneity 
with the Hausman test (un-displayed results), we replace all the bank specific variables in the two 
equations with their one quarter lag7.      
Table (4) shows the regression results with the Basel III formulations of capital. The results 
show that Basel III capital ratios have a positive bidirectional relationship with the NSFR. The higher 
the NSFR (the higher the liquidity of a bank) the higher the plain capital ratios. This result supports 
the “financial fragility structure” and the “crowding out of deposits” hypotheses. According to the 
                                                
7 Regarding liquidity and capital, which are not lagged in the simultaneous equations, we deal with endogeneity problems 
by adopting the GMM estimation method.  
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first, higher capital is associated with less monitoring, which reduced liquidity creation (Diamond 
and Rajan, 2000; 2001), while the second claim that higher capital could crowd out deposit and reduce 
liquidity creation (Gorton and Winton, 2000). The bidirectional relationship appears stronger, in 
column (1a) and (1b) where we take into account the off-balance sheet exposures in the leverage 
ratio. This result suggest that large banks manage liquidity risk with sophisticated strategies that 
involve off-balance sheet exposures, therefore the simple ratio of equity to total assets is less useful 
in understanding the relationship between capital and liquidity.  
 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
 
In table (5) we analyse the relationship between liquidity and capital with risk based and 
market based measures of capital. Columns (3a, 3b, 4a, 4b) of table 5 show the equation results with 
the different regulatory capital formulations: CET 1 and total capital ratio. We find that the NSFR 
coefficient is significantly positive only when the total capital ratio is the dependent variable. These 
results are in line with Distinguin et al. (2013), who claims that instead of strengthening their solvency 
standards, banks reduce their regulatory ratios when they face higher funding liquidity risk. We 
believe, that the relationship between the regulatory capital ratios and the NSFR is not significant 
because risk-based capital requirements do not represent the real leverage of a bank and thus the strict 
interplay between capital and liquidity management.  
In columns (5a) and (5b) we consider the market based formulation of capital. Since market 
capitalization is cyclical (Adrian et al., 2014) the coefficients of the NSFR in the capital equation is 
negative. Thus, we can conclude that we find again a positive relationship between capital and 
liquidity, similar to that observed in table 4.  
[Insert table 5 about here] 
 
To wrap up our results, we support the “financial fragility” and the “crowding out of deposits” 
hypotheses when we consider the Basel III leverage ratio with off-balance sheet exposures, the plain 
equity to total asset ratio and the market based definition of capital, while we do not find evidence of 
a relationship between capital and liquidity when we rely on regulatory capital ratios. These result, 
implies that the definition of capital is important for understanding the connections between capital 
and liquidity for large financial institutions. 
Regarding the other determinants of capital and liquidity, most of the findings are consistent 
with our predictions and those obtained in previous studies. The most relevant factors of the capital 
ratios are credit risk, size and GDP growth. The credit risk variables are significantly negative, 
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suggesting that banks strength their capital ratios when they face higher credit risk. The logarithm of 
total assets has a negative sign suggesting a negative association between capital ratios and size. 
Regarding the macroeconomic control, we find a countercyclical behaviour of regulatory capital 
ratios, while the other definitions of capital buffers seems to be cyclical. 
Focusing on the control variables in the liquidity equation, all the variables are positive and 
statistically significant. In contrast to the literature that covers the period before the global financial 
crisis (Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Distinguin et al., 2013) we find a positive association between 
size and the GDP growth with liquidity. As expected the coefficients of the spread in the one-month 
interbank rate is positive suggesting that shocks in the interbank market constraints banks to increase 
their liquidity. Moreover, the ECB liquidity injections increases bank liquidity during stressed market 
periods.  
Finally, we find a positive and significant sign of the lagged CDS spread variable in both the 
capital and liquidity equations. The result supports our hypothesis that during stressed market periods, 
banks try to increase liquidity and capital to overcome financial market turmoil.  
 
5.2 The impact of liquidity and capital on CDS spread changes  
 
To examine the importance of liquidity risk and capital, we ask whether both risks affect credit 
spread changes. The meaningful relationship between those variables discussed in section 4 indicate 
a joint management of liquidity and capital in banks. If this is true we should find that capital and 
liquidity risk contribute to CDS spread changes, as stated in H2.  
After the results regarding the relationship between liquidity risk and capital presented in the 
previous section, we believe that there is one main theoretical reason supporting our hypothesis. 
Firstly, literature on bank capital as well as literature on liquidity risk has established that both 
variables have strong implications for bank’s PD and financial stability. Secondly, the raising 
literature on liquidity creation and bank capital have highlighted the complementary nature of these 
two variables and the subsequent implications for financial stability and credit risk of financial 
institutions. We therefore have strong reasons to test whether or not capital and liquidity risk 
determines CDS spread changes.  
As can be seen from table (6) we run equation (2) in ten different settings, using alternatively 
all the capital formulations and both versions of the NSFR. More precisely, we run the regression 
with Basel III formulations of capital (models 1 to 4), the Basel II risk based measures of capital 
(models 5 to 8), as well as the market based measures of capital (model 9 and 10).  
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[Insert table 6 about here] 
 
The Basel III capital variables enters with positive and statistically significant coefficients. As 
regarding the risk based measures of capital, only the total capital ratio has a positive and significant 
sign. What emerges is the limitation of the CET1 ratio in measuring bank capitalization. This could 
be related by two reasons. The limited variation of the CET1 among banks and time8, and the limited 
sensitivity of risk-weigh capital ratios to market changes conditions as shown by Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al. (2013a). Finally, the market value of capital has a negative and significant sign at the 10% level. 
The positive sign of the capital ratios is consistent with the findings of Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013b) 
and reflects the too-big to fail status of the large banks comprised in our sample.   
The liquidity proxy variables are positive and insignificant in all the regression models, 
suggesting that funding liquidity risk is not a determinant of CDS spread changes for large European 
banks. However, the lack of significance of the variable could be explained in different ways. Large 
banks are more inclined to fail due to credit risk and banks with higher credit risk might reduce 
maturity mismatches in order to reduce the probability of default (Imbierowicz et al., 2014). In 
addition, during the crisis banks with ratios of NSFR closed to the target might have decreased lending 
to manage liquidity risk9. To shed further light into the matter, in the next sections we add a dummy 
variable to analyse if values of NSFR below one is a priced risk factor. Then we also analyse if 
liquidity ratios below the minimum requirement affect CDS spread changes through their interaction 
with capital measures.   
We found a positive relationship between asset quality and bank CDS spreads and a negative 
one between performance and bank CDS spreads. The signs of these two variables reveals that the 
probability of default tends to increase with poor-quality loan portfolio and/or lower returns on assets. 
These outcomes confirm the findings of Chiaramonte et al. (2011) and Hasan et al. (2015). The share 
of interest income over total income appears to increase CDS spreads. The sign of the coefficient is 
in line with Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013b) who highlighted that fee income is negatively related to 
CDS spreads. However, this sign is in contrast with the literature on bank failure, DeYoung et al. 
(2013) demonstrates that banks with a higher level of fee-income are more inclined to fail. In terms 
of the asset structure, both bank size and the ratio of loans to total assets are positively related to CDS 
spread changes. The sign of the size variable is consistent with the hypothesis that large banks have 
been considered by the market as “too big to fail” and thus more likely to be rescued (Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al., 2013b; Tarashev et al., 2009; Volz and Wedow, 2011). While the magnitude and significance 
                                                
8 All the banks comprised in our sample, also the most riskier, have a CET1 ratio above the minimum regulatory 
requirement.  
9 We test the proposition in the robustness test section. 
 20 
of the coefficient of bank loans is in line with the literature on bank default. As stated by Altunbas et 
al., (2011) the loan exposure is influenced by national factors; thus, in a weak macroeconomic 
environment it is likely that commercial banks have a higher probability of default. 
The equity volatility variable has coefficients consistent with theory (Merton, 1974) and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. As for the market-wide variables, the Eurostoxx and the Term 
spread variables both have coefficients expected and significant. In particular, the performance of the 
Eurostoxx has a negative significant sign, indicating that a deterioration in general business climate 
increases the probability of default and recovery rates, thus increasing CDS spread. While, the term 
spread has a positive and significant sign. This is related to the increase in peripheral European 
government 10-year yields during the sovereign crisis, which obviously affected sovereign and bank 
CDS spreads.   
  
5.2.1 Are threshold effects at play? 
While all the banks comprised in our sample meet the minimum required capital target, some 
banks do not meet the liquidity requirements while other have a NSFR well above the minimum 
required. To gauge the potential threshold effect, we add a dummy variable which takes value one in 
case of the NSFR is below the minimum required and zero otherwise. The results of the investigation 
are sown in table (7). We find a positive and significant sign of the last version of the NSFR in all 
regression formulations, while the first version of the NSFR is not significant only when we use the 
Basel III leverage ratio (column 1). The positive and significant sign of the NSFR could be due to the 
fact that banks with higher credit risk might reduce lending to keep liquidity risk low in order to 
maintain the total level of default risk limited10. On the contrary, banks with low credit risk do not 
necessarily have to manage both risks jointly because the overall risk is limited (Imbierowicz et al., 
2014). Although the NSFR recommendations will became effective in the 2018, the positive and 
significant sign of the dummy variable in all the regression results suggest that the credit derivatives 
market prices the risk of having higher liquidity mismatches. 
 
[Insert table 7 about here] 
 
5.2.2 Model with indirect effects of liquidity risk    
In this subsection, we assume that liquidity ratios below the minimum requirement affect CDS 
spread changes through their interaction with capital measures. Table (8) reports the estimation results 
                                                
10 The correlation matrix shows a positive correlation between the NSFR and the ratio of NPL to total loans, confirming 
our interpretation of the sign of the coefficient. In the robustness section, we demonstrate the proposition with an ad hoc 
regression model.    
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for models with indirect effect of liquidity risk. The specifications (1) to (10) add an interaction term 
between the capital ratio and the dummy variable that takes value one if the NSFR is below one.  
 
[Insert table 8 about here] 
 
The results suggest that the interaction between capital and liquidity risk affect bank 
probability of failure and thus CDS spread changes. In this setup, the NSFR is not significant in all 
the regression models, while he interaction terms are all positive and significant, with the exception 
of those with the equity to total assets proxy of capital (column 3-4). The sign and the coefficients of 
the control variables remain roughly equal in terms of magnitude and significance, confirming the 
findings of the previous regression models. Overall, these results show that the interaction between 
capital and liquidity affect the probability of failure when liquidity is below to the minimum 
regulatory target.    
 
6. Robustness tests 
6.1 Robustness bank capital and liquidity  
To test the reliability of our results on the relationship between bank capital and liquidity, we 
perform a battery of robustness checks. First, since the loan loss provision could be a discretionary 
tool to smooth earnings over time (Leventis et al., 2011), we redo the simultaneous equations system 
using an alternative credit risk measure. More specifically, we rely on the ratio of loan loss reserve 
to non-performing loans as a proxy of resources set aside to cover expected credit losses. The idea is 
that, if an institution lacks sufficient loan loss reserve to cover loans charged-off, the excess charge-
offs will be covered with capital. We expect a positive for this variable. The results are consistent 
with those previously obtained with the loan loss provision to total assets. The alternative credit risk 
measure has a positive and significant sign in all regression formulations, using alternative liquidity 
and capital variables (Table 9).  
We also examine the robustness of our results by considering two alternative liquidity proxies. 
We use the “liquidity transformation gap” (LT gap) defined in Deep and Schaefer (2004) and the 
“cat-fat” liquidity creation measure developed in Berger and Bouwman (2009). The LT gap is the 
difference between liquid liabilities and liquid assets held by a bank divided by its total assets, thus 
the higher the coefficient the higher the illiquidity of a bank. The “cat-fat” liquidity creation indicator 
assigns weights to different asset and liabilities based on their liquidity as defined in Berger and 
Bouwman (2009), similarly to the liquidity transformation gap the higher the coefficient the higher 
the illiquidity of a bank. Again, our checks are consistent with those previously obtained with the 
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NSFR variables (Table 10). Finally, according to Dietrich et al. (2014) business models have also an 
impact on the NSFR. Given the higher weights given on loans and deposits in the denominator and 
numerator of the NSFR respectively, financial institutions focused on the lending/deposit taking 
business might have a higher NSFR than banks with a higher proportion of investment bank activities. 
We control for business models by adding the ratio of interest income to total income in the liquidity 
regression. The results are consistent with those obtained previously (Table 11). Moreover, the 
interest income to total income variable has a positive and significant sign in line with the findings 
of Dietrich et al. (2014).  
 
6.2 Robustness CDS spread changes  
Several possible explanations are consistent with the positive relationship between the NSFR 
and CDS price changes. As discussed, during the crisis banks with higher credit risk might reduce 
lending to keep liquidity risk low in order to maintain the total level of default risk limited. Moreover, 
banks with higher illiquid assets on their balance sheet might have reduced lending to increase asset 
liquidity. To test these hypothesis, we estimate the following panel data fixed effect model. We 
regress the NSFR on five key drivers of liquidity risk management: (1) the level of non-performing 
loans, (2) the loan growth variable, (3) deposits as a fraction of total funding, (4) the Basel III leverage 
ratio. We also comprise asset size to proxy for many other sources of heterogeneity between banks. 
To gauge the effect of the crisis we interact the variables with the interbank pressure defined as the 
spread between the one-month interbank rate and the policy rates. We also control for time fixed 
effect with quarterly time dummies. The selection of the variables used is based on Cornett et al. 
(2011). Table (12) reports the regression results. We find evidence to support our statements. Banks 
with higher credit risk tend to increase liquid assets in order to maintain the overall risk limited. On 
the contrary, banks with higher NSFR ratios and lower credit risk continue to lend during the crisis 
period.    
To further check the results of our regression models, we gauge a set of robustness tests. First, 
we redo our regressions with alternative balance sheet ratios. More specifically, we use: the loan loss 
provision to total assets as a measure of asset quality, ROE for profitability. The diagnostic estimation 
confirms the results of the baseline regressions (Table 13, 14 and 15). In a not displayed check, we 
look at the impact of an alternative clustering setup. We clustered standard errors at the country level 
instead of the bank level and we confirm the results obtained previously. Finally, we also perform 
collinearity checks and correlation analysis among explanatory variables and do not find 
multicollinearity problems for all the regression reported11.  
                                                
11 Results not displayed for reasons of brevity.   
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7. Conclusions 
Capital and liquidity and are two important factors for bank survival. This study investigates 
the connections between these factors and the impact on market default probabilities on a sample of 
EU banks over the period 2005 to 2015. Using various configurations of capital and liquidity 
consistent with the new Basel III regulation, we find a bidirectional positive relationship between 
capital and funding liquidity risk. The results also indicate the importance of defining capital and 
liquidity proxies. More precisely, we highlight the importance of considering off-balance sheet 
exposures in understanding the connections between capital and liquidity. Our results support the 
“financial fragility/ crowding out of deposits” hypotheses developed in Diamond et al. (2000; 2001) 
and Gordon and Winton (2000) respectively, and are consistent with the empirical findings of 
Distinguin et al. (2013) and Horvath et al., (2014). Since the complex relationship between capital 
and liquidity and the importance of both factors for financial stability, we question if these are price 
risked factors in the CDS market. We find that capital is an important determinant of CDS spread 
changes, while the NSFR becomes significant only when the ratio falls below the minimum 
regulatory threshold. We also document that the interactions of both variables significantly determine 
bank’s market probability of default. 
Our results have several interesting policy implications. Although we cast doubts on the 
accuracy of Basel II risk weighted capital ratios, due to the sophisticate liquidity risk management of 
large banking institutions through off-balance sheet instruments. We support the need to implement 
minimum liquidity ratios concomitant with capital ratios, as we show that are closely related to each 
other. We also provide evidence of market discipline in CDS spreads, as we show that bank risk 
correlate positively with bank’s market probability of default. The derivative market evaluates 
changes in leverage and funding liquidity risk and incorporate those factors promptly into bank’s 
CDS spreads. Therefore, monitoring of such securities generates signals that may convey useful 
information to supervisors.  
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Table 1 
List of banks included 
 
Bank Country Bank Country 
 
Erste Group Bank AG 
 
Austria 
 
DNB ASA 
 
Norway 
Raiffeisen Bank  Austria Banco Comercial Portugues Portugal 
Dexia Belgium Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Spain 
Danske Bank A/S Denmark Banco Popolare Spain 
BNP Paribas SA France Banco Sabadell Spain 
Credit Agricole SA France Banco Santander SA Spain 
Natixis France Nordea Bank Sweden 
Societe General France Skandinaviska Enskilada Banken Sweden 
Commerzbank AG Germany Svenska Handelsbanken AB Sweden 
Deutsche Bank AG Germany Swedbank AB Sweden 
IKB Bank Germany Credit Suisse Group AG Switzerland 
Alpha Bank A.E. Greece UBS AG Switzerland 
Bank of Ireland Ireland Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen The Netherlands 
Banca Popolare di Milano Italy ING Bank NV The Netherlands 
Banca Monte Paschi di Siena Italy Barclays Bank PLC UK 
Intesa Sanpaolo SPA Italy HSBC Bank PLC UK 
Mediobanca SPA Italy Lloyds Bank PLC UK 
UBI Banca Italy Royal Bank of Scotland PLC/The UK 
Unicredit SPA Italy Standard Chartered Bank UK 
This table of the banks included in our analysis. For each bank we also report their home country.  
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Table 2 
List of variables used together with their definition and summary statistics 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Basel III leverage  The ratio of tangible equity to total assets and off-balance 
sheet exposures 
0.047 0.021 0.016 0.083 
Equity to Total 
Assets 
The ratio of tangible equity to total assets 0.056 0.041 0.020 0.093 
CET1 The ratio of common equity to risk weighted assets 0.161 0.056 0.049 0.188 
Total Capital The ratio of Tier 1 and 2 to risk weighted assets 0.140 0.036 0.096 0.208 
Market Capital The ratio of equity market value to total market value of 
assets 
0.077 0.109 0.002 0.404 
NSFR_10 The ratio of available stable funding to required stable fined 
as define by the Basel III document of December 2010 
1.048 0.218 0.368 2.158 
NSFR_14 The ratio of available stable funding to required stable fined 
as define by the Basel III document of December 2014 
1.072 0.223 0.381 2.190 
ROE Net income to total equity capital 0.081 0.151 -0.08 0.223 
LLP/TA The ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans 0.236 0.306 0.001 0.016 
MKT_BV Total Market Value to Book Value 0.883 0.205 0.546 1.201 
Size Logarithm of total assets  5.712 0.563 4.497 6.564 
GDP Growth Percentage of GDP growth 0.004 0.023 -0.09    0.053 
Interbank Spread Spread between the one-month interbank rate  
and the policy rates 
0.016 0.0163 -0.01 0.008 
ECB Lending ECB net lending to credit institutions 2.649 0.121 2.206 2.825 
LLR_NPL Loan loss reserve to non-performing loans 0.736 0.951 0.339 1.919 
Income 
diversification 
Interest income over total income 0.530 3.590 0.227 0.989 
NPL/TL The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 0.059 0.076 0.004 0.176 
ROA Return on Assets 0.005 0.048 -
0.008 
0.128 
Loans/TA The ratio of loans to total assets 0.530 0.179 0.195 0.786 
Equity Volatility 60 Days standard deviation of bank stock returns 40.55 31.25 15.26 92.77 
Euro Stoxx The natural logarithm of the Eurostoxx 600 index 2.467 0.081 2.24 2.599 
Term Spread The difference between the 10-year government bond yield 
for each Bank country and the 1-year Euribor/Libor rate.  
1.629 2.446 -0.64 6.076 
CDS spread The Natural Logarithm of CDS spread changes 1.933 0.555 0.528 3.360 
This table contains the description and the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the paper’s analysis. 
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Table 3 
Bank capital and liquidity risk proxy variables 
 
Category Proxy Calculation Definition 
    
Risk-
Unweighted 
Capital Ratio 
Basel III 
Leverage 
W/XY1Z3[	\:;12=W]2/3	^__[2_ + `aa	b/3/Xc[	_ℎ[[2	\e0]_;f[  The ratio of tangible equity to total assets and off-balance sheet exposures 
    
Risk-
Unweighted 
Capital Ratio 
Equity to 
Total 
Assets  
W/XY1Z3[	\:;12=W]2/3	^__[2_  The ratio of tangible equity to total assets 
    
Regulatory 
Capital 
CET1  .]gg]X	\:;12=$h^  The ratio of common equity to risk weighted 
assets 
    
Regulatory 
Capital 
Total 
capital 
W1[f	1 + W1[f	2$h^  The ratio of Tier 1 and 2 to risk weighted assets 
    
Market Capital Market 
Capital 
\:;12=	j/fk[2	l/3;[W]2/3	j/fk[2	l/3;[  The ratio of equity market value to total market value 
of assets 
    
Liquidity  NSFR_10 \:;12= + 0.95 ∗ "2/Z3[	<[0]_12_+0.90 ∗ .;_2]g[f_	<[0]_12 + 0.50 ∗ "ℎ]f2	2[fg	Z]ff],1XY0.5 ∗ j/fk[2/Z3[	_[c;f121[_+0.85 ∗ 3]/X_ +1 ∗ ]2ℎ[f	/__[2_12+0.05 ∗ `aa	Z/3/Xc[	_ℎ[[2	12[g_
 
The ratio of available stable 
funding to required stable 
fined as define by the Basel 
III document of December 
2010. 
    
Liquidity  NSFR_14 \:;12= + 0.90 ∗ "2/Z3[	<[0]_12_+0.80 ∗ .;_2]g[f_	<[0]_12 + 0.50 ∗ "ℎ]f2	2[fg	Z]ff],1XY0.50 ∗ j/fk[2/Z3[	_[c;f121[_+0.85 ∗ 3]/X_ +1 ∗ ]2ℎ[f	/__[2_+0.05 ∗ `aa	Z/3/Xc[	_ℎ[[2	12[g_
 
The ratio of available stable 
funding to required stable 
fined as define by the new 
Basel III document of 
October 2014 
This table contain the description and the calculation methodology of our target variables: capital and funding liquidity 
risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
12 Other assets are the sum of: the reserve for impaired loans, Non-earning assets (Total assets-total earnings assets- cash 
and due from banks), Fixed assets, Other earning assets, Insurance assets, investments in property and equity investments 
in associates.   
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Table 4 
Results of the estimating equation system (1) 
 
The capital ratios are those defined in the Basel III regulatory framework and the equity to total assets ratios. Results of 
the estimating equation system (1). The capital ratios are those defined in the Basel III regulatory framework and the 
equity to total assets ratios.  The liquidity ratios are the NSFR defined in the Basel III document of December 2010 (NSFR 
2010) and the NSFR defined in the Basel III document of October 2014 (NSFR 2014). See table (2) for the definition of 
the explanatory variables. In both the equations all bank-level explanatory variables are replaced with their one-quarter 
lagged value. * indicate statistical significance at 10% level, ** indicate statistical significance at 5% level, *** indicate 
statistical significance at 1% level. 
 Basel III 
Leverage 
Basel III 
Leverage 
Equity to Total assets Equity to Total Assets 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
 
Capital Equation 
    
     
NSFR_14 0.018** 
(3.21) 
 0.06* 
(1.87) 
 
NSFR_10  0.019** 
(3.27) 
 0.06* 
(1.77) 
Roe 0.08*** 
(4.20) 
0.08*** 
(4.20) 
0.09*** 
(4.46) 
0.09*** 
(4.45) 
LLP to TA -0.0002*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.0002*** 
(-3.64) 
-0.0002*** 
(-3.30) 
-0.0002*** 
(-3.29) 
MKT_BV 0.005 
(0.90) 
0.005 
(0.86) 
0.023** 
(2.89) 
0.023** 
(2.83) 
Size -0.014*** 
(-13.10) 
-0.014*** 
(-13.11) 
-0.014*** 
(-11.08) 
-0.014*** 
(-11.11) 
GDP Growth 0.150*** 
(3.68) 
0.150*** 
(3.70) 
0.187*** 
(3.74) 
0.186*** 
(3.74) 
CDS spreads 0.049*** 
(14.34) 
0.049*** 
(14.46) 
0.056*** 
(13.28) 
0.056*** 
(13.37) 
     
Liquidity Equation     
     
Capital 2.868*** 
(6.19) 
2.746*** 
(6.09) 
0.922** 
(2.15) 
0.909** 
(2.20) 
Size 0.084** 
(6.86) 
0.084** 
(7.02) 
0.059*** 
(4.68) 
0.061*** 
(4.88) 
Interbank Spread  10.861*** 
(3.45) 
10.544*** 
(3.44) 
14.86*** 
(4.32) 
14.358*** 
(4.29) 
ECB Lending 0.081** 
(2.58) 
0.078** 
(2.55) 
0.116*** 
(3.30) 
0.111*** 
(3.24) 
GDP Growth 0.622** 
(2.00) 
0.596** 
(1.96) 
0.60* 
(1.78) 
0.581* 
(1.74) 
CDS spreads 0.14*** 
(4.02) 
0.134*** 
(3.97) 
0.21*** 
(6.10) 
0.202*** 
(6.00) 
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Table 5 
Results of the estimated equation system (1) using Basel II risk weighted capital ratios and the market capital 
ratio 
 
Results of the estimating equation system (1). The capital ratios are those defined in the Basel II regulatory framework 
and the ratio of the market value of equity over the total market value.  The liquidity ratios are the NSFR defined in the 
Basel III document of December 2010 (NSFR 2010) and the NSFR defined in the Basel III document of October 2014 
(NSFR 2014). See table (2) for the definition of the explanatory variables. In both the equations all bank-level explanatory 
variables are replaced with their one-quarter lagged value. * indicate statistical significance at 10% level, ** indicate 
statistical significance at 5% level, *** indicate statistical significance at 1% level. 
 CET 1 CET 1 Total 
Capital 
Total 
Capital 
Market 
Capital 
Market 
Capital 
 (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
 
Capital Equation 
      
       
NSFR_14 0.034*** 
(3.41) 
 0.129* 
(1.86) 
 -0.094*** 
(-5.18) 
 
NSFR_10  0.034*** 
(3.54) 
 0.136* 
(1.91) 
 -0.092*** 
(5.02) 
 
Roe 0.03 
(0.25) 
0.02 
(0.28) 
-0.034** 
(-2.20) 
-0.034** 
(-2.20) 
0.235*** 
(3.75) 
0.233*** 
(3.72) 
LLP to TA -0.0003*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.0003*** 
(-3.03) 
-0.0002*** 
(-2.42) 
-0.0002*** 
(-2.43) 
-0.0005** 
(-2.74) 
-0.0005** 
(-2.76) 
MKT_BV -0.026** 
(-3.16) 
-0.027** 
(3.28) 
0.005 
(0.57) 
0.005 
(0.59) 
0.10*** 
(5.92) 
0.10*** 
(5.85) 
Size 0.023*** 
(10.47) 
0.026*** 
(10.43) 
0.027*** 
(20.12) 
0.026*** 
(20.13) 
-0.048*** 
(-5.92) 
-0.048*** 
(-1.49) 
GDP Growth -0.147** 
(-2.15) 
-0.146** 
(-2.15) 
-0.10** 
(-2.18) 
-0.101** 
(-2.17) 
0.583** 
(2.95) 
0.578** 
(2.93) 
CDS Spreads -0.018** 
(-2.46) 
-0.018** 
(-2.44) 
-0.010** 
(-2.11) 
-0.010** 
(-2.10) 
0.048*** 
(5.46) 
0.047*** 
(5.41) 
       
Liquidity Equation       
       
Capital 0.156 
(1.24) 
0.163 
(1.43) 
0.114 
(0.55) 
0.129 
(0.59) 
0.242*** 
(3.43) 
0.243*** 
(3.53) 
Size 0.043*** 
(3.14) 
0.043*** 
(3.32) 
0.043*** 
(2.90) 
0.044*** 
(3.03) 
0.051*** 
(3.79) 
0.051*** 
(3.96) 
Interbank Spread  17.018*** 
(5.24) 
16.441*** 
(5.18) 
17.95*** 
(5.20) 
17.40*** 
(5.17) 
15.138*** 
(4.41) 
14.578*** 
(4.37) 
ECB Lending 0.154*** 
(3.98) 
0.147*** 
(3.91) 
0.145*** 
(3.85) 
0.143*** 
(3.80) 
0.117*** 
(3.08) 
0.112*** 
(3.02) 
GDP Growth 0.475* 
(1.65) 
0.452* 
(1.55) 
0.438 
(1.15) 
0.419 
(1.13) 
0.556 
(1.51) 
0.539 
(1.49) 
CDS spreads 0.223*** 
(7.13) 
0.214*** 
(7.02) 
0.237*** 
(7.28) 
0.228*** 
(7.18) 
0.250*** 
(7.22) 
0.241*** 
(7.14) 
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Table 6 
Results of the Baseline model of CDS spread changes 
 
Regression of quarterly CDS spread over capital, liquidity, bank specific and structural variables. This table examines the 
association between CDS spreads and capital and funding liquidity risk using alternatively all the capital formulations 
and both versions of the NSFR.  See table (2) and (3) for the definition of the explanatory variables. * indicate statistical 
significance at 10% level, ** indicate statistical significance at 5% level, *** indicate statistical significance at 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Capital            
Basel III  
leverage 
3.99** 
(2.05) 
3.972** 
(2.04) 
        
           
Equity/ 
TA 
  4.024* 
(1.94) 
4.003* 
(1.93) 
      
           
CET1     0.589 
(1.57) 
0.587 
(1.57) 
    
Total  
Capital 
      2.491** 
(3.36) 
2.482** 
(3.34) 
  
           
Market  
Capital 
        -3.892* 
(-1.92) 
-3.885* 
(-1.91) 
Liquidity           
NSFR 2010 0.139 
(0.64) 
 0.179 
(0.81) 
 0.208 
(0.98) 
 0.171 
(0.87) 
 0.238 
(1.37) 
 
NSFR 2014  0.151 
(0.72) 
 0.187 
(0.87) 
 0.216 
(1.05) 
 0.179 
(0.94) 
 0.240 
(1.41) 
Asset Quality           
NPL/TL 2.047*** 
(3.92) 
2.051*** 
(3.95) 
1.895** 
(3.67) 
1.899** 
(3.69) 
1.980** 
(3.76) 
1.983** 
(3.78) 
1.840** 
(3.19) 
1.844** 
(3.21) 
1.810** 
(4.18) 
1.811*** 
(4.19) 
Performance           
ROA -0.218 
(-1.55) 
-0.215 
(-1.54) 
-0.480** 
(-3.20) 
-0.479** 
(-3.20) 
-
0.286*** 
(-4.35) 
-
0.285*** 
(-4.34) 
-
0.314*** 
(-4.35) 
-
0.314*** 
(-4.35) 
-
0.294*** 
(-6.19) 
-
0.294*** 
(-6.19) 
Business models          
Int. income  
to tot. income 
0.004*** 
(7.44) 
0.004*** 
(7.42) 
0.004*** 
(7.88) 
0.004*** 
(7.87) 
0.004*** 
(6.83) 
0.004*** 
(6.82) 
0.004*** 
(6.63) 
0.004*** 
(6.63) 
0.003*** 
(6.01) 
0.003*** 
(6.00) 
Loans/ 
TA 
1.680** 
(2.66) 
1.678** 
(2.65) 
1.641** 
(2.63) 
1.639** 
(2.62) 
1.887** 
(2.82) 
1.884** 
(2.82) 
1.774** 
(3.36) 
1.771** 
(3.35) 
1.841** 
(3.40) 
1.839** 
(3.39) 
           
Size 1.415** 
(3.68) 
1.417** 
(3.67) 
1.494*** 
(4.04) 
1.495*** 
(4.04) 
1.502** 
(3.61) 
1.503** 
(3.61) 
1.468*** 
(4.12) 
1.469*** 
(4.11) 
1.305*** 
(3.06) 
1.306*** 
(3.06) 
Structural variables and market wide factors        
Equity  
volatility 
0.004** 
(3.13) 
0.004** 
(3.14) 
0.004** 
(3.29) 
0.004** 
(3.30) 
0.003** 
(2.94) 
0.003** 
(2.96) 
0.004** 
(3.41) 
0.004** 
(3.42) 
0.003* 
(2.00) 
0.003* 
(2.01) 
Euro  
Stoxx  
-1.258** 
(-3.66) 
-1.261** 
(-3.68) 
-1.241** 
(-3.58) 
-1.244** 
(-3.60) 
-1.291** 
(-3.69) 
-1.295** 
(-3.71) 
-
1.445*** 
(-4.06) 
-
1.447*** 
(-4.08) 
-0.661* 
(-1.75) 
-0.665* 
(-1.77) 
Term  
Spread 
0.070*** 
(7.42) 
0.070*** 
(7.43) 
0.070*** 
(7.41) 
0.070*** 
(7.42) 
0.066*** 
(6.31) 
0.066*** 
(6.32) 
0.064*** 
(6.02) 
0.064*** 
(6.03) 
0.056*** 
(4.12) 
0.056*** 
(4.13) 
           
Constant -4.652* 
(-1.83) 
-4.668* 
(-1.83) 
-5.195** 
(-2.06) 
-5.206** 
(-2.06) 
-5.061* 
(-1.81) 
-5.070* 
(-1.81) 
-4.699* 
(-1.87) 
-4.711* 
(-1.87) 
-5.051* 
(-1.84) 
-5.054* 
(-1.84) 
           
Obs. 841          
           
Bank  
fixed  
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
           
Time  
fixed  
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
           
R2 63.56% 63.57% 63.47% 63.50% 61.33% 61.36% 63.91% 63.93% 68.33% 68.35% 
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Table 7 
Results of the Baseline model with threshold effects 
 
Regression of quarterly CDS spread over capital, liquidity, bank specific and structural variables. This table examines the 
thresholds effects of liquidity risk using alternatively all the capital formulations and both versions of the NSFR.  See 
table (2) and (3) for the definition of the explanatory variables. NSFR 10 < 1 and NSFR 14 <1 are dummy variables which 
take value one when respectively the first and the last version of the NSFR takes a value below one. * indicate statistical 
significance at 10% level, ** indicate statistical significance at 5% level, *** indicate statistical significance at 1% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Capital            
Basel III  
leverage 
3.93** 
(2.10) 
4.086** 
(2.17) 
        
           
Equity/ 
TA 
  3.974* 
(2.02) 
4.099* 
(2.08) 
      
           
CET1     0.588 
(1.60) 
0.592 
(1.60) 
    
Total  
Capital 
      2.522** 
(3.35) 
2.503** 
(3.31) 
  
           
Market  
Capital 
        -3.873* 
(-1.90) 
-3.840* 
(-1.88) 
Liquidity           
NSFR 2010 0.286 
(1.54) 
 0.329* 
(1.68) 
 0.363* 
(1.92) 
 0.342* 
(1.88) 
 0.301* 
(1.68) 
 
NSFR 2014  0.327* 
(1.72) 
 0.185* 
(1.85) 
 0.402** 
(2.13) 
 0.353* 
(1.99) 
 0.315* 
(1.81) 
NSFR 10 <1 0.089* 
(1.71) 
 0.092* 
(1.80) 
 0.977* 
(1.67) 
 0.107* 
(2.09) 
 0.041 
(0.63) 
 
NSFR 14 <1  0.129** 
(3.20) 
 0.127** 
(3.15) 
 0.137** 
(3.22) 
 0.127** 
(3.17) 
 0.057 
(1.00) 
Asset Quality           
NPL/TL 2.056*** 
(3.92) 
2.026*** 
(3.90) 
1.899** 
(3.64) 
1.869** 
(3.62) 
1.980** 
(3.75) 
1.957** 
(3.73) 
1.837** 
(3.17) 
1.817** 
(3.16) 
1.813** 
(4.14) 
1.804*** 
(4.13) 
Performance           
ROA -0.198 
(-1.51) 
-0.191 
(-1.51) 
-0.471** 
(-3.32) 
-0.472** 
(-3.34) 
-
0.278*** 
(-4.31) 
-
0.273*** 
(-4.31) 
-
0.313*** 
(-4.49) 
-
0.309*** 
(-4.54) 
-
0.291*** 
(-6.10) 
-
0.288*** 
(-6.04) 
Business models          
Int. income  
to tot. income 
0.004*** 
(7.81) 
0.004*** 
(8.25) 
0.004*** 
(8.27) 
0.004*** 
(8.70) 
0.004*** 
(7.12) 
0.004*** 
(7.44) 
0.004*** 
(6.99) 
0.004*** 
(7.20) 
0.003*** 
(6.03) 
0.004*** 
(5.95) 
Loans/ 
TA 
1.421** 
(3.77) 
1.663** 
(2.66) 
1.643** 
(2.66) 
1.628** 
(2.64) 
1.898** 
(2.88) 
1.887** 
(2.87) 
1.777** 
(3.42) 
1.767** 
(3.40) 
1.834** 
(3.35) 
1.828** 
(3.34) 
           
Size 1.415** 
(3.68) 
1.422** 
(3.80) 
1.498*** 
(4.13) 
1.501*** 
(4.17) 
1.501** 
(3.70) 
1.514** 
(2.87) 
1.470*** 
(4.23) 
1.477*** 
(4.25) 
1.305** 
(3.07) 
1.308** 
(3.08) 
Structural variables and market wide factors        
Equity  
volatility 
0.004** 
(3.15) 
0.004** 
(3.19) 
0.004** 
(3.31) 
0.004** 
(3.35) 
0.003** 
(2.94) 
0.003** 
(2.95) 
0.004** 
(3.42) 
0.004** 
(3.43) 
0.003* 
(2.00) 
0.003* 
(2.02) 
Euro  
Stoxx  
-1.283** 
(-3.70) 
-1.261** 
(-3.72) 
-1.269** 
(-3.60) 
-1.278** 
(-3.62) 
-1.319** 
(-3.75) 
-1.328** 
(-3.77) 
-
1.447*** 
(-4.13) 
-1.48*** 
(-4.13) 
-0.677* 
(-1.80) 
-0.687* 
(-1.82) 
Term  
Spread 
0.069*** 
(7.11) 
0.070*** 
(7.01) 
0.070*** 
(7.09) 
0.070*** 
(6.98) 
0.066*** 
(6.00) 
0.065*** 
(5.86) 
0.063*** 
(5.70) 
0.063*** 
(5.63) 
0.056*** 
(4.08) 
0.056*** 
(4.06) 
           
Constant -4.792* 
(-1.92) 
-4.827* 
(-1.94) 
-5.328** 
(-2.15) 
-5.369** 
(-2.18) 
-5.224* 
(-1.91) 
-5.282* 
(-1.93) 
-4.845* 
(-1.98) 
-4.889* 
(-1.99) 
-5.086* 
(-1.87) 
-5.105* 
(-1.87) 
           
Obs. 841          
           
Bank  
fixed  
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
           
Time  
fixed  
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
           
Cluster Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
R2 63.79% 64.05% 63.72% 63.96% 61.62% 61.90% 64.24% 64.93% 68.37% 68.42% 
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Table 8 
Results of the Baseline model with indirect effects of liquidity risk on CDS spread changes 
 
Regression of quarterly CDS spread over capital, liquidity, bank specific and structural variables. This table examines the 
indirect effects of liquidity risk using alternatively all the capital formulations and both versions of the NSFR.  See table 
(2) and (3) for the definition of the explanatory variables. Cap*NSFR 10 and Cap*NSFR 14 are the product of the capital 
formulation and the dummy variables NSFR 10 < 1 and NSFR 14 < 1 respectively. * indicate statistical significance at 
10% level, ** indicate statistical significance at 5% level, *** indicate statistical significance at 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Capital            
Basel III  
leverage 
3.66* 
(1.99) 
3.605* 
(1.94) 
        
           
Equity/ 
TA 
  4.377* 
(2.08) 
4.196* 
(2.02) 
      
           
CET1     0.560 
(1.64) 
0.558 
(1.65) 
    
Total  
Capital 
      2.269** 
(2.95) 
2.251** 
(2.93) 
  
           
Market  
Capital 
        -3.927* 
(-1.94) 
-3.893* 
(-1.92) 
Liquidity           
NSFR 2010 0.227 
(1.14) 
 0.658 
(0.30) 
 0.378* 
(2.05) 
 0.376* 
(2.08) 
 0.260 
(1.44) 
 
NSFR 2014  0.276 
(1.37) 
 0.119 
(0.57) 
 0.408** 
(2.21) 
 0.372* 
(2.09) 
 0.261 
(1.46) 
Cap*NSFR 
10  
1.379* 
(1.66) 
 -0.79 
(-1.21) 
 1.087** 
(2.10) 
 0.890** 
(2.08) 
 0.167** 
(2.46) 
 
Cap*NSFR 
14  
 2.513** 
(3.51) 
 -0.536 
(-0.76) 
 1.473** 
(3.58) 
 0.966*** 
(4.01) 
 0.184** 
(2.86) 
Asset Quality           
NPL/TL 2.079*** 
(3.95) 
2.068*** 
(3.97) 
2.053 ** 
(3.98) 
2.016*** 
(3.93) 
1.961** 
(3.69) 
1.927** 
(3.64) 
1.852** 
(3.20) 
1.834** 
(3.18) 
1.813** 
(4.22) 
1.813*** 
(4.22) 
Performance           
ROA -0.199 
(-1.48) 
-0.185 
(-1.43) 
-0.497** 
(-3.40) 
-0.489** 
(-3.36) 
-
0.295*** 
(-4.47) 
-
0.298*** 
(-4.58) 
-
0.326*** 
(-4.65) 
-
0.324*** 
(-4.71) 
-0.30*** 
(-6.18) 
-0.30*** 
(-6.18) 
Business models          
Int. income  
to tot. income 
0.004*** 
(7.53) 
0.004*** 
(7.80) 
0.004*** 
(7.95) 
0.004*** 
(7.89) 
0.004*** 
(6.74) 
0.004*** 
(6.88) 
0.004*** 
(7.16) 
0.004*** 
(7.37) 
0.003*** 
(5.98) 
0.004*** 
(6.00) 
Loans/ 
TA 
1.689** 
(2.71) 
1.683** 
(2.72) 
1.604** 
(2.56) 
1.617** 
(2.58) 
1.925** 
(3.01) 
1.921** 
(3.03) 
1.775** 
(3.51) 
1.758** 
(3.47) 
1.855** 
(3.42) 
1.857** 
(3.41) 
           
Size 1.435** 
(3.78) 
1.450** 
(3.82) 
1.472*** 
(3.99) 
1.480*** 
(4.00) 
1.512** 
(3.82) 
1.518** 
(3.88) 
1.481*** 
(4.35) 
1.486*** 
(4.35) 
1.307** 
(3.05) 
1.311** 
(3.05) 
Structural variables and market wide factors        
Equity  
volatility 
0.004** 
(3.15) 
0.004** 
(3.18) 
0.004** 
(3.31) 
0.004** 
(3.38) 
0.003** 
(3.05) 
0.003** 
(3.10) 
0.004** 
(3.44) 
0.004** 
(3.45) 
0.003* 
(2.00) 
0.003* 
(2.01) 
Euro  
Stoxx  
-1.278** 
(-3.72) 
-1.297** 
(-3.75) 
-1.267** 
(-3.85) 
-1.262** 
(-3.83) 
-1.319** 
(-3.79) 
-1.337** 
(-3.80) 
-1.48*** 
(-4.35) 
-1.46*** 
(-4.08) 
-0.653* 
(-1.74) 
-0.67* 
(-1.77) 
Term  
Spread 
0.069*** 
(7.24) 
0.070*** 
(7.12) 
0.070*** 
(7.74) 
0.070*** 
(7.63) 
0.066*** 
(6.23) 
0.066*** 
(6.20) 
0.063*** 
(5.80) 
0.063*** 
(5.77) 
0.056*** 
(4.13) 
0.056*** 
(4.13) 
           
Constant -4.807* 
(-1.92) 
-4.911* 
(-1.96) 
-4.879** 
(-1.97) 
-4.997** 
(-2.02) 
-5.239* 
(-1.97) 
-5.313* 
(-2.02) 
-4.938* 
(-2.05) 
-4.967* 
(-2.06) 
-5.118* 
(-1.85) 
-5.136* 
(-1.85) 
           
Obs. 841          
           
Bank  
fixed  
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
           
Time  
fixed  
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
           
Cluster Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
R2 63.69% 63.97% 63.62% 63.56% 61.84% 62.21% 64.44% 64.57% 68.38% 68.40% 
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Table 9 
Replacing LLP to TA with LLR to NPL in the capital equation 
 
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM with an alternative measure of credit risk in the capital 
equation. See table (2) for the definition of the explanatory variables. In both the equations all bank-level explanatory 
variables are replaced with their one-quarter lagged value. * indicate statistical significance at 10% level, ** indicate 
statistical significance at 5% level, *** indicate statistical significance at 1% level. 
PANEL A       
 Basel III 
Leverage 
Basel III 
Leverage 
Equity to Total 
assets 
Equity to Total 
Assets 
  
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)   
 
Capital Equation 
     
       
NSFR_14 0.032*** 
(6.19) 
 0.018** 
(2.59) 
   
NSFR_10  0.033*** 
(6.17) 
 0.018** 
(2.68) 
  
Control 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES   
      
Liquidity Equation      
       
Capital 3.359*** 
(7.30) 
3.252*** 
(7.27) 
2.051*** 
(4.76) 
2.060** 
(4.80) 
  
Control 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES   
       
PANEL B       
 CET 1 CET 1 Total Capital Total Capital Market 
Capital 
Market 
Capital 
 (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
 
Capital Equation 
     
      
NSFR_14 0.045*** 
(4.20) 
 0.023*** 
(3.08) 
 -0.092*** 
(3.88) 
 
NSFR_10  0.048*** 
(4.36) 
 0.025** 
(3.19) 
 -0.088*** 
(3.75) 
Control 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Liquidity Equation      
       
Capital 0.272* 
(1.65) 
0.277* 
(1.67) 
0.579*** 
(2.60) 
0.586*** 
(2.68) 
0.202*** 
(2.97) 
0.203*** 
(3.06) 
Control 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 10 
Replacing the NSFR with alternative liquidity proxies 
 
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM two alternative measures of liquidity risk in both 
equations. Liquidity creation is the “cat-fat” measure of liquidity creation as defined in Berger and Bouwman (2009). The 
LT GAP is the “liquidity transformation gap” (LT gap) of Deep and Schaefer (2004). The LT gap is the difference between 
liquid liabilities and liquid assets held by a bank divided by its total assets. See table (2) and (4) for the definition of the 
explanatory variables. In both the equations all bank-level explanatory variables are replaced with their one-quarter lagged 
value. * indicate statistical significance at 10% level, ** indicate statistical significance at 5% level, *** indicate statistical 
significance at 1% level. 
PANEL A       
 Basel III 
Leverage 
Basel III 
Leverage 
Equity to Total 
assets 
Equity to Total 
Assets 
  
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)   
 
Capital Equation 
     
       
Liquidity 
Creation 
-0.015* 
(1.75) 
 -0.028* 
(-1.79) 
   
LT GAP  -0.013* 
(1.80) 
 -0.05*** 
(-4.54) 
  
Control 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES   
      
Liquidity Equation      
       
Capital -0.69** 
(-2.01) 
-1.17** 
(-2.71) 
-0.959* 
(3.62) 
-0.43 
(-1.11) 
  
Control 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES   
       
PANEL B       
 CET 1 CET 1 Total Capital Total Capital Market 
Capital 
Market 
Capital 
 (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
 
Capital Equation 
     
       
Liquidity 
Creation 
-0.064** 
(-2.91) 
 -0.017 
(-1.01) 
 0.572* 
(1.55) 
 
LT GAP  -0.021** 
(1.87) 
 -0.028*** 
(-3.59) 
 0.134*** 
(5.32) 
Control 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Liquidity Equation      
       
Capital -0.93 
(-1.26) 
-0.01 
(-1.09) 
0.856** 
(2.29) 
-1.15*** 
(-5.78) 
0.407*** 
(8.73) 
0.222*** 
(4.23) 
Control 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 11 
Considering income diversification in the liquidity equation 
 
This table shows the results of estimating system (1) using GMM and considering income diversification in the liquidity 
equation. Income diversification is the ratio of interest income over total income. See table (2) and (4) for the definition 
of the explanatory variables. In both the equations all bank-level explanatory variables are replaced with their one-quarter 
lagged value. * indicate statistical significance at 10% level, ** indicate statistical significance at 5% level, *** indicate 
statistical significance at 1% level. 
PANEL A         
 Basel III 
Leverage 
Basel III 
Leverage 
Equity to 
Total assets 
Equity to 
Total Assets 
    
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)     
 
Capital 
Equation 
        
         
NSFR_14 0.023*** 
(4.12) 
 0.03* 
(1.65) 
     
NSFR_10  0.024*** 
(4.25) 
 0.07* 
(1.60) 
    
Control 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES     
         
Liquidity Equation        
         
Capital 3.204*** 
(6.67) 
3.085*** 
(6.60) 
1.213** 
(2.09) 
1.28** 
(2.21) 
    
Control 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES     
PANEL B         
 CET 1 CET 1 Total 
Capital 
Total 
Capital 
Market 
Capital 
Market 
Capital 
  
 (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)   
 
Capital Equation 
       
         
NSFR_14 0.037*** 
(3.44) 
 0.012* 
(1.74) 
 -0.088*** 
(-4.88) 
   
NSFR_10  0.039*** 
(3.57) 
 0.013* 
(1.81) 
 -0.085*** 
(-4.68) 
  
Control 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES   
         
Liquidity Equation        
         
Capital 0.147 
(1.17) 
0.155 
(1.24) 
-0.007 
(-0.30) 
0.159 
(0.70) 
0.247*** 
(3.43) 
0.250** 
(3.55) 
  
Control 
Variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES   
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Table 12 
Liquidity risk management during the crisis 
 
This table test the liquidity management assumptions during the crisis. The dependent variables are NSFR 2010 and 
NSFR 2014, respectively. NPL/TLt-1 is the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans of the previous quarter. We use 
this variable to examine the connections between funding liquidity risk and credit risk of the loan portfolio. We include 
the variation of loans over total loans, the ratio of deposits over total funding, the Basel III leverage ratio and the logarithm 
of total assets (size). All the mentioned variables are interacted with the interbank spread as defined in table (2) to take in 
consideration the effect of the crisis. We control for bank fixed effects and time fixed effects using quarterly dummies. 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. * indicate statistical significance at 10% level, ** indicate statistical 
significance at 5% level, *** indicate statistical significance at 1% level. 
 NSFR 2010 NSFR 2014 
   
NPL/TLt-1 -0.431** 
(-2.63) 
-0.443** 
(-2.67) 
∆Loans 0.194** 
(2.70) 
0.195** 
(2.66) 
∆Loans*Interbank spread 32.078* 
(1.76) 
32.317** 
(1.76) 
Deposit/Total Fundingt-1 0.149 
(1.05) 
0.190 
(1.32) 
Deposit/Total Fundingt-1*Interbank spread 17.834 
(1.66) 
18.550 
(1.69) 
Basel III leveraget-1  0.593 
(0.45) 
0.575 
(0.72) 
Basel III leveraget-1*Interbank spread -27.548** 
(-2.57) 
-27.832** 
(-2.57) 
Sizet-1 -0.033 
(-0.26) 
-0.032 
(-0.26) 
Size*Interbank spreadt-1 -5.757** 
(-2.21) 
-5.751** 
(-2.19) 
   
Observations 954 954 
Quarterly Dummies YES YES 
Bank fixed effects YES YES 
Cluster Bank-level Bank-level 
R2 adjusted 0.173 0.183 
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Table 13 
Baseline model with alternative proxies of Asset quality and Performance 
 
Regression of quarterly CDS spread over capital, liquidity, bank specific and structural variables. This table display the 
results of the regression model of table 6 using alternative balance sheet ratios. See table (2) and (3) for the definition of 
the explanatory variables. * indicate statistical significance at 10% level, ** indicate statistical significance at 5% level, 
*** indicate statistical significance at 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Capital            
Basel III  
leverage 
6.56** 
(2.90) 
6.546** 
(2.89) 
        
           
Equity/ 
TA 
  6.102** 
(2.66) 
6.085** 
(2.65) 
      
           
CET1     0.923 
(1.43) 
0.923 
(1.43) 
    
Total  
Capital 
      4.093*** 
(5.05) 
4.095*** 
(5.03) 
  
           
Market  
Capital 
        -4.482** 
(-2.24) 
-4.480** 
(-2.23) 
Liquidity           
NSFR 2010 -0.202 
(-1.14) 
 -0.229 
(-1.32) 
 -0.168 
(-0.87) 
 -0.107 
(-0.81) 
 -0.010 
(-0.07) 
 
NSFR 2014  -0.179 
(-1.04) 
 -0.206 
(-1.23) 
 -0.146 
(-0.78) 
 -0.089 
(-0.71) 
 0.002 
(0.10) 
Asset Quality           
LLP/TA -
0.001*** 
(-4.88) 
-
0.001*** 
(-4.87) 
-
0.001*** 
(-6.08) 
-
0.001*** 
(-6.07) 
-
0.001*** 
(-5.04) 
-
0.001*** 
(-5.04) 
-
0.001*** 
(-6.87) 
-
0.001*** 
(-6.87) 
-
0.001*** 
(-5.61) 
-
0.001*** 
(-5.61) 
Performance           
ROE -0.442** 
(-2.40) 
-0.443** 
(-2.40) 
-0.511** 
(-3.03) 
-0.511** 
(-3.02) 
-0.486** 
(-2.58) 
-0.486** 
(-2.57) 
-0.359** 
(-2.59) 
-0.359** 
(-2.58) 
-0.258** 
(-2.14) 
-0.251** 
(-2.14) 
Business models          
Int. income  
to tot. income 
0.004*** 
(6.45) 
0.004*** 
(6.46) 
0.004*** 
(6.92) 
0.004*** 
(6.93) 
0.004*** 
(5.45) 
0.004*** 
(5.47) 
0.004*** 
(5.17) 
0.004*** 
(5.18) 
0.003*** 
(4.63) 
0.003*** 
(4.63) 
Loans/ 
TA 
2.155** 
(3.64) 
2.153** 
(3.63) 
2.084** 
(3.48) 
2.082** 
(3.48) 
2.078** 
(3.10) 
2.087** 
(3.10) 
2.197*** 
(5.01) 
2.195*** 
(5.01) 
2.182*** 
(4.04) 
2.180*** 
(4.04) 
           
Size 1.706*** 
(5.10) 
1.709*** 
(5.11) 
1.843*** 
(5.79) 
1.846*** 
(5.80) 
1.816*** 
(4.86) 
1.819*** 
(4.87) 
1.720*** 
(5.72) 
1.722*** 
(5.74) 
1.579** 
(3.90) 
1.580** 
(3.91) 
Structural variables and market wide factors        
Equity  
volatility 
0.004** 
(3.72) 
0.004** 
(3.72) 
0.004** 
(3.73) 
0.004** 
(3.72) 
0.003** 
(3.09) 
0.003** 
(3.09) 
0.004** 
(4.08) 
0.004** 
(4.08) 
0.003** 
(2.52) 
0.003** 
(2.54) 
Euro  
Stoxx  
-0.899** 
(-2.52) 
-0.897** 
(-2.52) 
-0.975** 
(-2.70) 
-0.973** 
(-2.69) 
-1.072** 
(-3.28) 
-1.071** 
(-3.27) 
-
1.378*** 
(-4.44) 
-
1.378*** 
(-4.43) 
-0.198 
(-0.57) 
-0.198 
(-0.57) 
Term  
Spread 
0.072*** 
(6.40) 
0.072*** 
(6.41) 
0.070*** 
(6.54) 
0.071*** 
(6.55) 
0.064*** 
(4.98) 
0.064*** 
(5.00) 
0.059*** 
(4.96) 
0.059*** 
(4.97) 
0.054*** 
(3.50) 
0.054*** 
(3.51) 
           
Constant -7.056** 
(-3.17) 
-7.095** 
(-3.19) 
-7.596** 
(-3.49) 
-7.636** 
(-3.51) 
-6.966** 
(-2.81) 
-7.006* 
(-2.83) 
-6.307** 
(-3.03) 
-6.332** 
(-3.05) 
-7.458** 
(-2.95) 
-7.481** 
(-2.96) 
           
Observations 977 977 997 997 894 894 942 942 925 925 
Bank  
fixed  
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time  
fixed  
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
R2 62.75% 62.71% 62.49% 62.45% 57.98% 57.95% 65.10% 65.08% 66.58% 66.57% 
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Table 14 
Model with threshold effects and alternative proxies of Asset quality and Performance 
 
Regression of quarterly CDS spread over capital, liquidity, bank specific and structural variables. This table display the 
results of the regression model of table 7 using alternative balance sheet ratios. See table (2) and (3) for the definition of 
the explanatory variables. * indicate statistical significance at 10% level, ** indicate statistical significance at 5% level, 
*** indicate statistical significance at 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Capital            
Basel III  
leverage 
6.508** 
(2.94) 
6.605** 
(2.94) 
        
           
Equity/ 
TA 
  6.039** 
(2.70) 
6.090** 
(2.71) 
      
           
CET1     0.922 
(1.44) 
0.927 
(1.44) 
    
Total  
Capital 
      4.096*** 
(5.06) 
4.079*** 
(4.99) 
  
           
Market  
Capital 
        -4.474** 
(-2.21) 
-4.445** 
(-2.19) 
Liquidity           
NSFR 2010 -0.703 
(-0.47) 
 -0.083 
(-0.55) 
 0.008 
(0.04) 
 0.064 
(0.47) 
 0.110 
(0.66) 
 
NSFR 2014  -0.008 
(-0.06) 
 -0.032 
(-0.21) 
 0.069 
(0.39) 
 0.090 
(0.72) 
 0.131 
(0.88) 
NSFR 10 <1 0.083 
(1.34) 
 0.091 
(1.57) 
 0.110 
(1.39) 
 0.107 
(1.63) 
 0.078 
(0.88) 
 
NSFR 14 <1  0.124** 
(2.80) 
 0.124** 
(3.10) 
 0.152** 
(2.41) 
 0.128** 
(2.35) 
 0.095 
(1.25) 
Asset Quality           
LLP/TA -
0.001*** 
(-4.88) 
-
0.001*** 
(-4.33) 
-
0.001*** 
(-6.07) 
-
0.001*** 
(-5.88) 
-
0.001*** 
(-5.51) 
-
0.001*** 
(-5.32) 
-
0.001*** 
(-7.59) 
-
0.001*** 
(-7.34) 
-
0.001*** 
(-6.00) 
-
0.001*** 
(-5.94) 
Performance           
ROE -0.434** 
(-2.38) 
-0.428** 
(-2.37) 
-0.504** 
(-3.02) 
-0.502** 
(-3.03) 
-0.478** 
(-2.62) 
-0.472** 
(-2.64) 
-0.353** 
(-2.62) 
-0.351** 
(-2.63) 
-0.247** 
(-2.12) 
-0.245** 
(-2.11) 
Business models          
Int. income  
to tot. income 
0.004*** 
(6.47) 
0.004*** 
(6.88) 
0.004*** 
(6.95) 
0.004*** 
(7.43) 
0.004*** 
(5.46) 
0.004*** 
(5.77) 
0.004*** 
(5.29) 
0.004*** 
(5.45) 
0.003*** 
(4.46) 
0.003*** 
(4.50) 
Loans/ 
TA 
2.130** 
(3.58) 
2.111** 
(3.58) 
2.058** 
(3.45) 
2.042** 
(3.45) 
2.057** 
(3.01) 
2.034** 
(2.97) 
2.164*** 
(4.91) 
2.147*** 
(4.86) 
2.145** 
(3.78) 
2.138*** 
(3.82) 
           
Size 2.130*** 
(3.58) 
1.698*** 
(5.17) 
1.834*** 
(5.83) 
1.834*** 
(5.87) 
1.806*** 
(3.01) 
1.805*** 
(4.88) 
1.707*** 
(5.72) 
1.711*** 
(5.75) 
1.566** 
(3.81) 
1.569** 
(3.83) 
Structural variables and market wide factors        
Equity  
volatility 
0.004** 
(3.47) 
0.004** 
(3.85) 
0.004** 
(3.79) 
0.004** 
(3.81) 
0.003** 
(3.17) 
0.003** 
(3.18) 
0.004** 
(4.24) 
0.004** 
(4.25) 
0.003** 
(2.55) 
0.003** 
(2.57) 
Euro  
Stoxx  
-0.917** 
(-2.54) 
-0.925** 
(-2.56) 
-0.995** 
(-2.70) 
-1.002** 
(-2.73) 
-1.099** 
(-3.32) 
-1.073** 
(-3.36) 
-1.40*** 
(-4.48) 
-
1.403*** 
(-4.50) 
-0.219 
(-0.64) 
-0.225 
(-0.66) 
Term  
Spread 
0.072*** 
(6.17) 
0.072*** 
(6.10) 
0.070*** 
(6.25) 
0.071*** 
(6.19) 
0.063*** 
(4.77) 
0.063*** 
(4.70) 
0.058*** 
(4.72) 
0.059*** 
(4.69) 
0.053*** 
(3.40) 
0.053*** 
(3.38) 
           
Constant -7.126** 
(-3.27) 
-7.160** 
(-3.29) 
-7.654** 
(-3.59) 
-7.692** 
(-3.62) 
-7.039** 
(-2.91) 
-7.073** 
(-2.93) 
-6.365** 
(-3.14) 
-6.404** 
(-3.15) 
-7.463** 
(-2.94) 
-7.488** 
(-2.95) 
           
Observations 977 977 997 997 894 894 942 942 925 925 
Bank  
fixed  
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time  
fixed  
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
R2 62.93% 63.10% 62.49% 62.84% 58.34% 58.60% 65.39% 65.50% 66.72% 66.77% 
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Table 15 
Results of the Baseline model with indirect effects of liquidity risk on CDS spread changes and alternative 
measures of Asset Quality and Performance 
 
Regression of quarterly CDS spread over capital, liquidity, bank specific and structural variables. This table display the 
results of the regression model of table 8 using alternative balance sheet ratios. See table (2) and (3) for the definition of 
the explanatory variables. * indicate statistical significance at 10% level, ** indicate statistical significance at 5% level, 
*** indicate statistical significance at 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Capital            
Basel III  
leverage 
6.394*** 
(3.01) 
6.187** 
(2.81) 
        
           
Equity/ 
TA 
  5.582** 
(2.29) 
5.454** 
(2.22) 
      
           
CET1     0.869 
(1.46) 
0.867 
(1.47) 
    
Total  
Capital 
      3.859*** 
(4.89) 
3.842*** 
(4.78) 
  
           
Market  
Capital 
        -4.573* 
(-2.22) 
-4.542** 
(-2.22) 
Liquidity           
NSFR 2010 -0.162 
(-0.98) 
 -0.116 
-(0.55) 
 0.068 
(0.39) 
 0.077 
(0.62) 
 0.164 
(0.11) 
 
NSFR 2014  -0.088 
-(0.53) 
 -0.072 
(-0.36) 
 0.118 
(0.69) 
 0.092 
(0.77) 
 0.027 
(0.18) 
Cap*NSFR 
10 
0.642 
(0.54) 
 0.788** 
(2.34) 
 1.562** 
(2.20) 
 0.832** 
(2.21) 
 0.239 
(1.44) 
 
Cap*NSFR 
14 
 1.769* 
(1.79) 
 1.037** 
(3.04) 
 2.012** 
(3.47) 
 0.92** 
(3.05) 
 0.256 
(1.64) 
Asset Quality           
LLP/TA -0.001*** 
(-4.85) 
-0.001*** 
(-4.76) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.88) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.84) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.42) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.39) 
-0.001*** 
(-7.72) 
-0.001*** 
(-7.44) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.55) 
-0.001*** 
(-5.54) 
Performance           
ROE -0.441** 
(-2.40) 
-0.438** 
(-2.40) 
-0.526** 
(-3.12) 
-0.530** 
(-3.13) 
-0.487** 
(-2.69) 
-0.488** 
(-2.75) 
-0.356** 
(-2.64) 
-0.356** 
(-2.65) 
-0.248** 
(-2.13) 
-0.229** 
(-2.13) 
Business models          
Int. income  
to tot. income 
0.004*** 
(6.54) 
0.004*** 
(6.59) 
0.003*** 
(6.90) 
0.003*** 
(6.93) 
0.003*** 
(5.71) 
0.003*** 
(5.75) 
0.004*** 
(5.48) 
0.004*** 
(5.49) 
0.003*** 
(4.59) 
0.004*** 
(4.62) 
Loans/ 
TA 
2.158** 
(3.68) 
2.159** 
(3.70) 
2.114** 
(3.59) 
2.119** 
(3.59) 
1.799** 
(3.20) 
2.064** 
(3.18) 
2.172*** 
(5.06) 
2.155*** 
(5.01) 
2.195*** 
(4.05) 
2.198*** 
(4.05) 
           
Size 1.716*** 
(5.25) 
1.735*** 
(5.28) 
1.840*** 
(5.80) 
1.842*** 
(5.81) 
1.799*** 
(5.07) 
1.796*** 
(5.11) 
1.717*** 
(5.89) 
1.722*** 
(5.90) 
1.580** 
(3.88) 
1.585** 
(3.90) 
Structural variables and market wide factors        
Equity  
volatility 
0.004** 
(3.77) 
0.004** 
(3.79) 
0.004** 
(3.77) 
0.004** 
(3.78) 
0.003** 
(3.30) 
0.003** 
(3.34) 
0.004** 
(4.23) 
0.004*** 
(4.24) 
0.003** 
(2.52) 
0.003** 
(2.53) 
Euro  
Stoxx  
-0.906** 
(-2.53) 
-0.917** 
(-2.56) 
-0.972** 
(-2.68) 
-0.972** 
(-2.68) 
-1.124** 
(-3.40) 
-1.121** 
(-3.42) 
-
1.386*** 
(-4.45) 
-
1.385*** 
(-4.44) 
-0.182 
(-0.52) 
-0.184 
(-0.53) 
Term  
Spread 
0.072*** 
(6.31) 
0.072*** 
(6.18) 
0.070*** 
(6.36) 
0.070*** 
(6.36) 
0.064*** 
(4.94) 
0.064*** 
(4.95) 
0.059*** 
(4.77) 
0.059*** 
(4.76) 
0.053** 
(3.48) 
0.054** 
(3.49) 
           
Constant -7.137** 
(-3.30) 
-7.291* 
(-3.35) 
-7.705** 
(-3.57) 
-7.764** 
(-3.57) 
-7.031** 
(-3.02) 
-7.070** 
(-3.07) 
-6.450** 
(-3.25) 
-6.485** 
(-3.26) 
-7.538** 
(-2.94) 
-7.580** 
(-2.96) 
           
Obs. 977 977 997 997 894 894 942 942 925 925 
Bank  
fixed  
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time  
fixed  
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-
level 
Bank-level 
R2 62.77% 62.89% 62.64% 62.72% 58.97% 59.43% 65.50% 65.58% 66.67% 66.67% 
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Abstract 
 
This paper empirically examines the causal effect of bank credit rating changes on bank capital 
structure decisions. Banks adjust their capital structure following a credit rating downgrade. 
Adjustments involve: leverage, rating sensitive liabilities and lending. Rating upgrades do not affect 
capital structure activities suggesting that banks target minimum rating levels. In our study, we also 
exploit the asymmetric impact of downgrades of banks based in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal during the EU sovereign debt crisis. This asymmetric effect leads to greater capital 
adjustments, reductions in long-term funding and lending of banks from those countries relative to 
other banks. Our results are consistent with the expectation of discrete cost (benefits) associated with 
rating changes.  
 
 
Keywords: Bank ratings; Bank capital structure; Lending; Placebo effects; EU sovereign debt crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Theoretical (Diamond and Rajan, 2000; Allen et al., 2011; De Angelo and Stulz, 2015) and 
empirical research (Brewer et al., 2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Gropp and Heider, 2010) have 
shown the existence and the determinants of banks’ optimal capital ratios. However, shocks may 
create a wedge between optimal and actual capital ratios. In this context, the literature has investigated 
the effect of excess control rights (Lepetit et al., 2015) and the international factors (De Jonghe and 
Öztekin, 2015) affecting bank capital adjustments. In this paper, we consider an important aspect of 
bank capital structure management, i.e. the capital structure adjustment process following a rating 
change. In particular, we examine the influence of credit ratings changes on capital, funding and 
lending decisions in a partial adjustment framework.  
The impact of credit ratings on bank capital structure decisions has not been formally 
investigated in the banking literature to date. Credit ratings assigned by the major rating agencies, 
such as Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s and Fitch are widely used by investors and regulators 
as objective measures of the quality of financial instruments. These ratings directly affect banks in 
various ways. On the liability side, ratings directly drive the issuance and the cost of long-term debt 
and are also used in interbank markets to determine the eligibility of counterparties to participate in 
a transaction. The impaired access to external funding has the direct consequence of reducing lending 
supply (Adelino and Ferreira, 2016). Moreover, rating changes also affect the cost of equity issuance, 
since downgrades have a direct negative impact on bank share prices (Caselli et al., 2016; Correa et 
al., 2014). More informally the anecdotal evidence in the financial press supports the impact of bank 
rating downgrades on lending, access to funding, collateral requirements and cost of capital (Vaughan 
2012; Watkinks, 2012). Equally, managers’ statements provide evidence on the importance of credit 
ratings. As an example, on March 2016, Deutsch Bank CFO said in an interview: “the lender needs 
to move back into A ratings over longer term” (Keller, 2016).  
In this paper, we argue that bank managers are concerned about credit ratings, due to the 
discrete cost associated with different credit levels. For instance, since institutional investors take in 
consideration credit ratings for their investment decisions, a downgrading event would result in a 
subsequent increase of funding costs. We establish that credit rating changes directly affect bank 
capital structures and capital adjustments decisions. However, banks might be reluctant to issue new 
equity and are likely to rely on internal sources to achieve target capital ratios. They could move to 
target capital ratios with two different strategies: shrinking of assets and funding adjustments. 
Consequently, the adjustment process following a downgrade is prone to affect both bank lending 
and funding decisions. We take in consideration these potential effects and we analyse also the impact 
of rating changes on lending and funding adjustment decisions.   
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To investigate the effect of rating changes on banks’ capital adjustments, we use a data set 
drawn from Bloomberg on 76 banks based in the EU and the US over 2005Q1-2015Q4. The database 
combines banks’ balance sheet and rating data on a quarterly basis. This allows us to analyse every 
capital structure adjustment that turns to be important for the market. We model capital ratios with 
variables capturing both the banks’ target capital as well as the effect of adjustment costs and rating 
changes. More specifically, we readapt the partial adjustment framework with credit rating changes 
developed in Kisgen (2009) for non-financial firms.  
We find that banks react asymmetrically to rating changes, increasing capital after 
downgrades but responding little after upgrades. This result implies that bank managers target a 
specific credit level, in a similar way as non-financial firms (Kisgen, 2006; 2009). The capital build-
up process after a rating downgrade is mainly driven by earning retention, while reductions in risk 
weights seems to be related to other factors. Moreover, we find that downgrades impair the access to 
market funding and causes a shift from long-term funding to other funding sources. Deleveraging has 
potentially adverse effects if bank simultaneously engage in asset shrinking through cutting lending 
(Hanson et al., 2011). We then examine the effect of rating changes on bank lending and we find that 
banks reduce lending supply activities after a downgrade.  
The sovereign debt crisis represents a major challenge to our empirical exercise, as sovereign 
credit risk feedback into the financial sector through the rating channel (BIS, 2011). The transmission 
mechanism is the following: owing to strong links between sovereign and banks, sovereign 
downgrades often lead to downgrades of domestic banks (Alsakka et al., 2014; Klusak et al., 2017; 
Huang and Shen, 2015). In fact, although the sovereign ceiling technically no longer exists, there is 
evidence that sovereign ratings affect the ratings of non-sovereigns (Borensztein et al. 2013; Almeida 
et al., 2017; Klusak et al., 2017) As an example, for Greece, Ireland and Portugal rating agencies have 
linked their downgrades of major banks to the sovereign declining creditworthiness (Moody’s 2010a, 
2010b; Standard & Poor’s 2010a, 2010b). As banks’ credit rating declines, their funding costs 
increase and their market access diminishes. The downward pressure on banks’ ratings from Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain experienced during the sovereign debt crisis may have increased 
the effect of rating changes on capital structure and lending of banks from those countries. We 
quantify this incremental effect of bank downgrades by comparing banks from countries that 
experienced the sovereign debt crisis (treatment group) with banks from the other countries (control 
group). The ratings of the treatment group are affected disproportionately more than the ratings of 
the control group by macroeconomic shocks and constraints imposed by rating changes rather than 
bank fundamentals. We capture the asymmetric impact using a difference in difference estimator that 
compares changes in capital, funding composition and loan supply made by treated banks versus 
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control banks around credit rating changes. We find that treated banks react strongly than non-treated 
banks following a credit rating downgrade. Treated banks are likely to increase more shareholders’ 
funds to total funds and earnings retention following a credit downgrade. Moreover, the impact is 
greater on long-term funding and consequently on lending supply as treated banks experienced higher 
funding constraints that impaired lending supply activities.    
A number of placebo and falsification tests suggests that the incremental effects are not 
confounded by other factors. Specifically, to rule out that our results are driven by rating changes and 
not only to the deterioration in macroeconomic fundamentals of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain, we conduct a placebo test in which we replace the downgrade dummy variable with a crisis 
dummy that takes value one during the financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis and zero 
otherwise. The result of the test confirms that the incremental effect of rating changes in the treated 
group is explained by rating changes. However, the identification strategy already addressed this 
possibility: the treatment group contains banks with a rating closer to the sovereign bound that should, 
a priori, be less sensitive to macroeconomic shocks than control banks. To further rule out that our 
results are driven by rating changes and the sovereign rating channel, we conduct a falsification test 
in which we analyse if the incremental effects were at work before the sovereign debt crisis. Again, 
the test confirms our previous results.  
We provide several contributions to the literature. First, we add to the strand of empirical 
literature on the determinants of bank capital (Brewer et al., 2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Gropp 
and Heider, 2010; Lindquist, 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008; 2011; Adrian and Shin, 2010;) and bank 
capital management (Berger et al., 2008; Lepetit et al., 2015; Memmel and Raupach, 2010; De Jonghe 
and Öztekin 2015). We add to this literature by studying the effect of credit rating changes on bank 
capital structure and lending. Research from the corporate finance literature demonstrates that ratings 
affect a firm’s cost of capital (Kisgen and Strahan, 2010), capital structure decisions (Kisgen, 2006) 
and leverage adjustments towards the target leverage ratios (Kisgen, 2009). Moreover, in contrast to 
the studies cited above, the higher frequency of our data (quarterly data compared with yearly) 
enables us to estimate each bank’s adjustment following rating changes, which turns to be important 
for financial markets. 
This study is also related to the literature on the transmission of sovereign credit risk to the 
banking sector, in which the rating channel has not received higher attention. To the best of our 
knowledge only Alsakka et al. (2014) and Adelino and Ferreira (2016) investigate the existence of 
the rating channel through which the sovereign credit crisis spreads to the financial sector. Other 
works explore the transmission of sovereign risk to the banking sector. Acharya et al. (2014) provides 
evidence of a double feedback loop between sovereigns and the financial sector as a result of 
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governments’ implicit and explicit guarantees to the financial sector and holdings of sovereign bonds. 
Recent studies also examine the effect of banks’ holdings of domestic sovereign debt on bank lending 
during the European sovereign debt crisis (Popov and Van Horen, 2015; Acharya et al., 2015; Becker 
and Ivashina, 2014). 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we examine the importance of credit rating 
for bank capital structure. Section 3 contains the empirical methodology. Section 4 describes the data. 
In Section 5, we present the results. Section 6, we perform a battery of robustness checks. Section 7 
concludes.  
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1 The importance of credit ratings for bank capital structure 
 
The fundamental hypothesis of this paper is that credit ratings matter for capital structure 
decisions of banks, due to the discrete costs (benefits) associated with different rating levels. The 
empirical investigation in this paper explores capital structure decision-making and lending following 
a rating change, with banks downgraded adjusting their capital structure through reductions in 
leverage, long-term funding and lending. 
Credit ratings are significant for capital structure decisions of banks for at least three reasons: 
regulation on bond investments and funding cost associated, information content of rating and 
theoretical reasons in the context of existing capital structure theories. Bank ratings are an important 
determinant of the issuance cost of senior unsecured debt. Long-term debt is an important source of 
funding. According to the ECB (2016) and Van Rixtel et al. (2015) the amount outstanding of debt 
securities issued with an original maturity above one year is nearly 15% of total liabilities for 
European banks. The summary statistics in Table 2 confirms this empirical evidence for our sample 
of banks. In addition, the importance of long-term funding sources is further enhanced by the recent 
developments on banking supervision, such as the Basel III liquidity risk requirements and the 
European supervisory regulatory and Bail-in resolution framework. Rating downgrades generally 
cause banks to pay higher spreads on their bond funding, and may also reduce market access; if 
institutional investors that are restricted to investment grade bonds are forced to liquidate their 
holdings of bank bonds as their ratings fall below the investment grade threshold.  
Credit ratings provide information on banks’ riskiness through the cycle beyond other publicly 
available information. The evaluation process of rating agencies comprises information that is not 
publicly available. However, compared to other corporations, banks pose a particular challenge for 
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credit rating agencies. Their asset structure and importance for financial stability determine the degree 
of external assistance, that obviously changes the shape of risk factors to which they are exposed. 
Due to the opaqueness of the banking sector, the judgments of the major rating agencies tend to 
disagree over time (Morgan, 2002). Moreover, the reliability and the quality of credit ratings tend to 
change over the business cycle (Hau et al., 2012). If bank ratings contain important information, they 
will signal bank overall credit risk. Thus, banks in the same rating group would be assessed similar 
default probabilities and associated yields for their bonds. Banks near a downgrade in rating will then 
have an incentive to maintain the higher ratings. 
The importance of credit ratings is also theoretical. Kisgen (2007; 2009) shows the importance 
of credit ratings on capital structure decision frameworks for non-financial firms, including also a 
discussion of credit ratings in the context of existing capital structure theories, such as the trade-off 
and the pecking order theory. Roughly described the intuition is the following. The trade-off theory 
argues that firms will balance the benefits of tax shields and other benefits of debt against the cost of 
bankruptcy and other cost of debt to determine an optimal level of leverage. An implication of the 
trade-off is that a firm tend to move back toward its optimal leverage when it departs from it. If the 
rating-dependent cost (benefit) is material, managers will balance that cost against the traditional 
adjustment costs implied by the trade-off theory. In certain situations, the cost associated with a 
change in credit rating may result in capital structure adjustments that are different from that implied 
by the traditional trade-off theory factors. In other cases, the trade-off factors may out-weight credit 
rating considerations.  
Capital structure theories were tested for banks in Gropp and Heider (2010), finding 
similarities between non-financial and financial firms. Moreover, a collection of works on bank 
capital management (De Jonghe and Oztekin, 2014; Lepetit et al., 2015; Berger et al., 2008;) adopts 
the partial adjustment models of Flannery and Rangan (2006). The partial adjustment framework 
implies that banks should adjust their capital structure based on the trade-off between the adjustment 
costs and the costs of operating with suboptimal leverage.    
 
 
2.2 Determinants of optimal bank capital ratios 
 
Theoretical (Diamond and Rajan, 2000; Allen et al., 2011; De Angelo and Stulz, 2015) and 
empirical research (Brewer et al., 2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Gropp and Heider, 2010) have 
shown the existence and the determinants of banks’ optimal capital ratios. From the analysis of the 
literature, we retrieve the following determinants of optimal bank capital ratios: profitability, asset 
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risk, asset and liability structure, income structure, cost efficiency and macroeconomic controls. 
Profitability is a key determinant of bank capital. According to the pecking order theory funding extra 
capital is the most expensive choice, hence it may be easier to increase capital via earning retentions 
and weaker dividend payments (Flannery and Rangan, 2008). According to Jokipii and Milne (2011) 
the management of capital and risk are dependent on the size of capital buffer. For low capitalized 
banks the relationship between adjustments in capital and risk are negative, while for well capitalized 
ones it is positive. Regarding the speed of adjustment towards their target capital and risk level, the 
authors find that low capitalized banks adjust significantly faster than their better capitalized 
counterparts. Altunbas et al. (2011), Köhler (2015), Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) 
successfully demonstrated the impact of business models on risk from different perspectives. 
According to the authors, banks involved in non-income activities or attracting non-deposit funding 
are inclined to operate with higher leverage. Banks’ chartered value has also an impact on capital 
buffers. Banks with higher chartered values might raise capital more easily and cheaply than their 
peers, implying less need of capital buffers (Berger et al.; 2008). On the contrary, Gropp et al. (2010) 
suggests that bank reputation and chartered value should be protected by larger capital buffers.  
The macroeconomic cycle is also a determinant of optimal bank capital. Following Jokipi and 
Milne (2008), Lindquist (2004), Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) raising capital during economic 
downturns is much more difficult, thus banks might be forced to reduce their lending activities to 
meet rising capital requirements. Therefore, bank capital ratios can be viewed as countercyclical. 
Finally, according to De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015) the level of inflation is also important as it 
induces banks to hold less capital.  
 
 
 
2.3 Determinants of long-term funding decisions 
 
In contrast to the corporate finance literature, the empirical banking literature has not devoted 
much attention yet to the determinants of banks’ long term debt. The theoretical and empirical 
investigations have mainly focused on deposits (Allen et al., 2014; among others) and short-term 
funding sources (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; among others). To the best of our knowledge 
only Van Rixtel et al. (2015) and Camba-Mendez et al. (2012) have investigated the determinants of 
long-term debt issuance. Gropp and Heider (2010) have shown that standard determinants of non-
financial firms’ leverage also apply to large EU and US banks. Therefore, we can hypothesize that 
the choice for long-term debt is shaped by various factors at the firm level, such as: credit and liquidity 
risk, profitability and capitalisation.  
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With regard to credit risk, banks might decide to change their funding structure through 
issuances of long-term debt to overcome deposit supply constraints derived by higher credit risk in 
their loan portfolios. Moreover, they might also have issued long-term debt securities to target the 
new liquidity rules, such as the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). Profitability is another determinant 
of bank bond issuance. More profitable banks can have easily access to bond markets. Leverage is 
also a determinant as stronger capital buffers might improve the ability of banks to absorb risk, thus 
highly capitalised banks can access easily to bond markets and consequently issue more debt 
securities. Furthermore, as demonstrated by Baker and Wurgler (2002) for non-financial firms, 
market timing is an important determinant of capital structure decisions. When policy interest rates 
are low, issuances of bank bonds are expected to rise.  
 
 
2.3 Determinants of lending supply at the micro-bank level 
 
Bank lending is influenced by a series of macro- and bank-specific factors. In our capital 
structure context, we are interested in identifying the effect of capital and funding constraints that 
will ultimately affect the supply of credit. To do so we derive a set of bank-level and macroeconomic 
determinants from the literature, that are likely to influence bank lending activities. More specifically, 
we identify four bank-specific covariates. The first variable of interest is capital. Various papers 
assess the impact of bank capital on loan supply (Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011; Cornett et 
al., 2011; Carlson et al., 2013; Osborne et al., 2016) emphasising cyclical variation in bank leverage 
and risk-appetite. Secondly, according to Altunbas et al. (2011), bank risk conditions are important 
determinants of banks’ ability to supply new loans. Thirdly, when funding liquidity risk materialized, 
banks with stable sources of financing continued to lend relative to other banks during crisis periods 
(Cornett et al., 2011). Finally, off-balance sheet exposure has also a large impact on lending. When 
borrowers drew on pre-existing commitments in large quantities, liquidity constraints grew up with 
the effect of reducing lending supply.  
 
 
 
3. Empirical methodology  
3.1 Partial adjustment model  
We test the impact of rating changes on capital structure decisions using the partial adjustment 
framework formulated in Flannery and Rangan (2006) and modified in Kisgen (2009) to include 
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rating effects of capital structure decisions for non-financial firms. In a partial adjustment model, the 
current capital ratio of a bank, s-E,5, is a weighted average of its target capital ratio, s-E,5AB∗  and the 
previous capital ratio, s-E,5AB, as well as a random shock, G-E,5: 
 s-E,5 = Us-E,5AB	∗ + 1 − U s-E,5AB + G-E,5	     (1) 
 
In a frictionless world, all banks chose the target capital ratio (U = 1), however in practice 
banks needs time to adjust their capital and assets to move toward the target ratio. Hence, each year 
a bank closes a proportion U of the gap between its actual and target level. The larger the lambda (U), 
the higher the ability of a bank to adjust its capital levels toward the target. The target capital is 
unobserved and not constant over time.  
 s-E,5∗ = 8u-E,5AB	     (2) 
 
 
Substituting the equation of target capital (2) into equation (1) yields the common partial adjustment 
model developed in Flannery and Rangan (2006), and implemented also in De Jonghe et al. (2015), 
Lepetit et al. (2015) and Berger et al. (2008) in the banking literature.  
   s-E,5 = U8u-E,5AB + 1 − U s-E,5AB + G-E,5	     (3) 
 
Following Kisgen (2009), we modify equation (3) to examine the incremental effects of rating 
changes by including rating changes dummies:  
 s-E,5 = U8u-E,5AB + 1 − U s-E,5AB + vB@],XYf/<[-,5AB + vwx0Yf/<[-,5AB + I- + I5 	+ G-E,5	 (4) 
 
 
Where: s-E,5 is the capital ratio defined as Tier 1 regulatory capital or alternatively 
shareholders’ funds over total assets. u-E,5AB	is a vector of banks and macro-specific determinants of 
bank optimal capital ratios; the vector includes: the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans 
(NPL) to proxy for asset risk, bank profitability (Return on assets, Roa), the ratio of deposits over 
total funding (Deposits), the ratio of non-interest income over the sum of interest and non-interest 
income (Non-interest income), the level of overhead costs to total revenues (Cost income), the ratio 
of total loans over total assets (Loans), the percentage change of consumer prices (Inflation), the 
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percentage change of GDP of a certain country (GDP growth), the ratio of the sum of book value of 
liabilities and market value of equity to book of assets (Tobin Q).  @],XYf/<[-,5AB and x0Yf/<[-,5AB are dummy variables equal to 1 if the bank was downgraded or upgraded in a specific 
quarter, respectively. We hypothesize that an upgrade should have no impact, while a downgrade will 
presumably accelerate a banks’ adjustment toward its target capital structure. I- are bank fixed effects 
and I5 are year fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant characteristic (Mackay and 
Phillips, 2005; Lemmon et al., 2008).   
We capture the adjustment in long-term funding and lending using a similar dynamic model 
as in equation (4). More specifically, for long-term funding adjustments, we modify equation (4) as 
follows:  
 9W	@[Z2-E,5 = U8u-E,5AB + 1 − U 9W	@[Z2-E,5AB + vB@],XYf/<[-,5AB + vwx0Yf/<[-,5AB + Iy +I5 	+ G-E,5	    (5) 
 
where: 9W	@[Z2-E,5	is total long term debt over total debt. u-E,5AB is a vector of bank-specific and 
macroeconomic determinants of long-term funding, that includes: the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), 
the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans (NPL), the return on assets (Roa), total 
shareholders’ funds over total assets (Equity to Total Assets), the percentage change of GDP by 
country (GDP growth), the base rate set by central banks (Policy rates), the percentage change of 
consumer prices (Inflation). Downgrade is a dummy variable which takes value one if the bank is 
downgraded in a specific quarter. Upgrade is a dummy variable which takes value one if the bank is 
upgraded in a specific quarter. Iy	and I5 are country and time fixed effects, respectively. We control 
for country fixed effects instead of bank fixed effect, because during the crisis country-specific risk 
factors might be more relevant than bank-specific factors in determining long-term funding decisions 
(Van Rixtel et al., 2015).   
To analyze the adjustments in lending supply, we modify equation (4) as follows: 
 9]/X_-E,5 = U8u-E,5AB + 1 − U 9]/X_-E,5AB + vB@],XYf/<[-,5AB + vwx0Yf/<[-,5AB + Iy +I5 	+ G-E,5	    (6) 
 
 
where: 9]/X_-E,5 is total loans over total assets. u-E,5AB is a vector of controls, containing: Tier 1 
capital divided by total risk weight assets (Tier 1), the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans 
(NPL), the level of balance sheet exposure over total assets (Off-balance), the net stable funding ratio 
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(NSFR), the percentage change of GDP of a certain country (GDP growth), the base rate set by the 
central banks (Policy rates). u-E,5AB contains also the interactions between the NSFR, the level of 
non-performing assets and the Tier 1 capital with the policy rates (NSFR * Policy Rates, NPL * Policy 
Rates, Tier 1 * Policy Rates). The interactions allow us to account for cyclicality in bank capital, 
liquidity and credit risk management.  
 
 
3.2 Econometric issues of partial adjustment models 
We estimate equations (4-6) using Blundell and Bond’s (1998) system GMM estimates, since 
the model suffers from potential endogeneity of several right-hand side variables. To choose the 
appropriate instruments, we follow an identification strategy similar to Vallascas and Hagendorff 
(2013). Specifically, we use the first lag difference of bank characteristics as instruments in the level 
equation and the second and third lags of bank characteristics as instruments in the difference 
equation. With this set of instruments, we treat all bank characteristics as endogenous covariates, 
while treating macro controls and rating events as exogenous. The number of lags varies to ensure 
that the models pass both Hansen and second order autocorrelation tests.14 Similarly to Lepetit et al. 
(2015), De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015) and Berger et al. (2008), in this study we employ the one step 
estimator, since the two-step tend to bias the estimated standard errors downward (Blundell and Bond, 
1998).  
According to Flannery et al. (2013), Blundell and Bond’s (BB) estimation methodology 
should be the default choice under the conditions of potential endogeneity and dependent variable 
persistence in the context of capital adjustment models. However, the authors noticed that the fixed 
effect (FE) estimator is the most accurate with respect to the exogenous variables, but exhibits much 
higher errors for the lagged variables. The reliability of the FE estimator increases in longer panels. 
Taking into account the higher accuracy with respect of the exogenous variables and the properties 
of our dataset we test the results of the BB estimator with the fixed effect estimator.     
 
 
3.3 Sovereign rating channel 
Owing to strong links between sovereigns and banks, sovereign ratings often lead to 
downgrades of domestic banks. The dependence of banks rating on sovereign ratings has been evident 
during the sovereign debt crisis (BIS, 2011). The downward pressure on banks’ rating intensified 
                                                
14 When augmenting the number of lags of the instruments, we take in consideration the threat that system GMM easily 
generate instruments that are numerous and suspect (see Roodman, 2009).  
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during the sovereign debt crisis due to the perceived decreasing ability of peripheral countries to 
provide support to their banking sectors. This in turn affected banks’ funding costs and worsened 
their access to money and deposit markets. Therefore, credit rating downgrades have a different 
impact on banks that are headquartered in countries that experienced the sovereign EU debt crisis 
(treated banks) in comparison to banks headquartered in other countries (non-treated banks). We 
believe that the transmission of sovereign risk through the rating channel might increase the effect of 
bank credit rating changes, since banks from those countries have experienced the mentioned 
downward pressure on credit ratings. Based on our hypothesis, our treatment group consists of banks 
headquartered in countries with sovereign problems (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Our 
control group consists of banks headquartered in non-stressed countries (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, UK, US). The choice is motivated by the fact that 
all banks in the treatment group experienced problems in accessing on market funding sources due to 
the spike in bond yields of their sovereigns during the period 2010-2012.    
To measure the differential effect, we run ordinary least squares regressions (OLS) and 
estimate a difference-in-differences regression with the following form:   
 ∆=-E,5 = 8B b/Xk- = @1_2f[__[<	.];X2f=E ∗ @],XYf/<[-,5AB + 8w b/Xk- =@1_2f[__[<	.];X2f=E ∗ x0Yf/<[-,5AB + 8{ b/Xk- = @1_2f[__[<	.];X2f=E + 8|u-,5AB 	+	}5 + }y + }- + G-E,5		       (7) 
 
 
where: ∆=-E,5 is the dependent variable that accounts either for capital adjustment (∆Tier 1, ∆Equity 
over total assets, ∆RWA and ∆Retained earnings), long-term funding adjustment (∆LT Debt) or 
lending (∆Loans). u-,5AB are the same vectors of bank and macro controls defined in equations (4-6), }5 is a year fixed effect, }y is country fixed effect and }- is lender fixed effects. We implement 
specifications in which we replace year fixed effects and country fixed effects with country-by-year 
fixed effects (	}y ∗ 	}5), which absorb all shocks that are common to banks in a specific country in 
each year. The coefficients of the interaction terms  b/Xk- = @1_2f[__[<	.];X2f=E ∗@],XYf/<[-,5AB and (b/Xk- = @1_2f[__[<	.];X2f=E) ∗ x0Yf/<[-,5AB  captures the difference in 
the reaction of treated versus non-treated banks following a downgrade and an upgrade event, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  
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4. Bank sample and rating data 
We construct a panel of bank’s ratings from January 2005 to December 2015 based on rating 
data from Standard & Poor’s. We measure bank’s rating with foreign currency long-term issuer 
rating, in which rating agencies use a sovereign’s rating as an upper bound of issuer located in each 
country. We decided to rely on S&P’s rating history for three main reasons. Firstly, S&P provide the 
most extensive coverage of bank ratings. Secondly, it demonstrates greater ability to revise and lead 
other agencies (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002, Alsakka et al., 2014). Thirdly, it seems that S&P 
ratings have a greater impact on the market since they are not fully anticipated (Reisen and von 
Maktzan, 1999; Adelino and Ferreira, 2016). We gather rating changes information from Bloomberg 
Professional Services and we retain the largest listed banks headquartered in Europe and the US. To 
avoid double counting ratings, we hold rating changes information at the highest consolidation level; 
for example, Santander UK is rejected while Banco Santander is retained. Information on rating 
downgrades and upgrades are translated into two distinct quarterly time series, with numerical value 
equal to one if a downgrade or upgrade occurs during that quarter, and zero otherwise. We also adjust 
our panel of rating changes for sovereign rating events. Alsakka et al. (2014), show the evidence of 
a sovereign rating channel, to which sovereign rating downgrades leads bank rating downgrades. 
Thus, we correct our data on rating events adding a numerical value equal to one in the case that a 
sovereign rating change anticipate bank rating changes.15  
Rating data are matched through a text-string matching algorithm with quarterly accounting 
data from Bloomberg professional service. On Bloomberg, all financial information of EU and US 
listed banks are available. However, the selection of banks is further narrowed down by the 
availability of quarterly financial information data. Quarterly data allow us to estimate each bank’s 
adjustment that turns to be important for the market, and better identify financing tensions associated 
with certain market and economic conditions.  
After applying the criteria, the whole sample consist of 56 banks from 14 Euro area countries 
(AT, BE, CY, DE, DK, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, NL, SP, SL, PT), UK, Sweden, and Switzerland and 20 
banks from US. Appendix A provides the number of banks for each country and the number of rating 
changes observed. Our sample is well represented across countries in terms of national total banking 
assets and does not have over representation of smaller countries. Moreover, it includes all European 
and US globally important banks (G-SIBs) identified by the Financial Stability Board. Table 1 
provides information on the definition, source and summary statistics of the variables used in our 
empirical investigation.  
                                                
15 In the dataset, we have not found any quarterly anticipation, since bank rating downgrades on average occurs a few 
days after sovereign downgrades. This is in line with Alsakka et al. (2014) that observes that S&P migrate bank ratings 
simultaneously with sovereign ratings.  
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[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Capital Adjustment 
Table 2 reports the results of equation (4) with Tier 1 and shareholder funds to total assets as 
target capital ratios. We run the Blundell-Bond (1998) GMM estimator in columns (1) and (2), while 
in columns (3) and (4), we further validate our results with the FE estimator. In line with Gropp and 
Heider (2010), we include bank-fixed effects to control for time-invariant bank characteristics and 
time-fixed effects.   
Results in Table 2 include dummy variables for whether banks were downgraded or upgraded 
in the previous quarter. With the BB GMM estimator the coefficient for the downgrade variable is 
economically and statistically significant at the 5% level with both target capital measures. This 
suggests that downgraded banks attempt to regain their previous rating through capital adjustment. 
This is consistent with our hypothesis of a link between credit ratings and capital structure decisions 
in the banking industry, and in line with Kisgen (2006, 2009) results for non-financial firms. The 
upgrade variable is not statistically significant different from zero in both regressions (1) and (2). 
This is also consistent with the credit rating-capital structure hypothesis because it indicates that bank 
managers do not attempt to reverse an upgrade, because it provides discrete benefits for the bank 
itself. According to our results, capital structure decisions are affected by whether banks were 
downgraded in the previous quarter as much as changes in profitability, credit risk or funding 
composition. With the fixed effect estimator, the coefficients on the credit rating downgrade remain 
significant for the equity to total asset ratio and insignificant with the Tier 1 ratio; while the coefficient 
on upgrades remains no longer significant.  
The results reported in columns (1) and (2) also show the constant adjustment speed of the 
target capital ratios. The adjustment speed of the Tier 1 ratio is 0.30 per quarter (=1-0.693, where 
0.693 is the coefficient of the lagged Tier 1 ratio), while the adjustment speed of the equity to total 
asset ratio is 0.33 (= 1-0.668, where 0.668 is the coefficient of the lagged equity to total assets ratio). 
The magnitude of the adjustment speeds varies across the two capital measures; banks adjust toward 
their target Tier 1 ratio slower than toward their Equity to total asset target. The result is in line with 
Berger et al. (2008), who finds that adjustments toward the target risk-weighted capital ratios are 
slower than the un-weighted counterpart. The magnitude of the adjustment speed parameter is in the 
range obtained for an international sample of banks (0.29 for banks worldwide in De Jonghe and 
Öztekin (2015) using system GMM) and large US banks (0.40 for U.S. Bank Holding Companies in 
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Berger et al. (2008) using system GMM). The magnitude of the adjustment speed is further confirmed 
in columns (3) and (4) with the FE estimator (0.268 and 0.25 for Tier 1 and Equity to total assets 
ratio, respectively). 
Table 2 also reports the estimates of the bank-specific and country specific drivers of target 
capital ratios. With the Tier 1 target capital (columns 1 and 3), we find that only credit risk (NPL) 
and Tobin-Q are significant. More variables are significant with the non-weighted capital ratio, 
namely profitability, cost efficiency, deposit reliance and the non-interest income over total income 
are significant determinants of bank capital. This suggests that more profitable and cost efficient 
banks are more capitalized. Thus, as hypothesized by Flannery and Rangan (2008) and Gropp and 
Heider (2010), more profitable banks tend to hold higher capital buffers. Lower credit risk induces 
banks to hold less capital consistently with Jokipi and Milne (2011) and Nier and Baumann (2006). 
Higher deposits reliance and higher involvement in non-interest activities are positively associated 
with capital. The positive sign of the former variable might be related to the fact that deposits are 
prone to runs, thus banks tend to hold a buffer of capital to reduce information asymmetries and 
prevent runs from deposit holders. The sign of the non-interest income ratios is in line with the 
hypothesis that bank activities that generate non-interest income are riskier than traditional activities 
and thus require a higher capital cushion, as shown in Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010). 
Regarding the macroeconomic determinants, in contrast with our hypothesis, we find a positive 
significant coefficient of the GDP growth variable. This suggests that capital ratios might be pro-
cyclical, in the sense that banks use an expansionary macroeconomic environment to accumulate 
capital (Leaven and Majnoni, 2003; Schaeck and Cihák, 2012). Moreover, according to Brewer et al. 
(2008), during recessions defaults on bank loans increase and generate higher losses that are charged 
against bank capital.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Banks can use different strategies to increase their capital ratios. According to Cohen and 
Scatigna (2016) the build-up of bank capital over recent years is mainly driven by earnings retention, 
while reductions in risk-weighted assets play a less important role. To analyse these different 
strategies that characterize the capital build-up process, we run model (4) with risk-weighted assets 
to total assets and retained earnings to total assets as dependent variables.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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Table 3 shows the results of the estimations. In column (1), we find that after a downgrade 
banks reduced their risk-weighted assets, suggesting that they shift from risky to less risky assets. 
However, we find a negative and significant coefficient also for the upgrade variable. The symmetric 
effect is in contrast with our predictions, since we expect an asymmetric effect similar to that observed 
with the target capital ratios. We believe that this progressive reduction in risk-weighted assets might 
be a consequence of the crisis and not an effect of credit rating changes.  
As regard the control variables, in line with Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013), we find that 
risk-weighted increases with loans. In addition, we find a negative association with non-performing 
loans, suggesting that banks with a higher stock of bad loans are less prone to reduce risk-taking 
activities. In column 2 and 4, we find that earnings retention increases after a downgrading event. 
The coefficient of the downgrading variable is highly significant at the 5% level, while the upgrading 
coefficient is not statistically significant. The result is in line with the pecking order theory, as bank 
rely on earnings retention and weaker dividend payments to build up capital after a credit rating 
downgrade.  
 
 
5.2 Funding Adjustment 
Capital structure adjustments following downgrades might also affect the composition of bank 
funding. Banks may reduce their reliance on debt financing when they become riskier, such as 
following a downgrading event. However, during the financial crisis bond issuance might be affected 
by other factors. For example, banks that need to overcome liquidity constraints might have issued 
new debt securities even if the costs went up.  
Table 4 shows that we find an economically significant negative relationship between long-
term debt funding and rating downgrades. While, as expected the upgrade coefficient is not 
statistically significant for both the BB estimator and the FE estimator. This result, confirms our 
hypothesis that banks reduce long-term bond issuance after a downgrading event, due to the higher 
costs associated with lower ratings. Thus, downgraded banks suffer funding constraints due to 
impaired access to markets, higher collateral requirements and higher funding costs associated with 
rating triggers.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The speed of adjustment of the long-term debt is 0.22 with the BB estimator and 0.176 with 
the FE, which is lower than that observed with in the capital adjustment regression (Table 2). The 
magnitude of the coefficient suggests that the shift in funding sources requires a longer time in 
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comparison to capital adjustment decisions. With respect to the control variables, we find a negative 
sign for the NSFR and the level of non-performing loans, suggesting that banks with higher funding 
liquidity risk and credit risk issue less debt securities. One explanation might be that higher liquidity 
and credit risk increases the probability of distress and thus the cost and the access to the funding 
sources. In line with Van Rixtel et al. (2015) we find a positive sign of the performance variable 
(ROA), thereby supporting the hypothesis that more profitable banks have better access to financial 
markets. Finally, GDP and inflation enter with a positive significant sign, indicating that banks issue 
more debt securities in expansionary periods.   
 
 
5.3 Lending adjustments 
To estimate the impact of rating changes on lending supply, we estimate the partial adjustment 
model described in equation (6). Table 5 presents the results of the estimation. Column (1) includes 
the regression results using the Blundell-Bond estimator with year and country fixed effects, while 
column (2) contains the regression results using the FE estimator with year fixed effects. We find 
that, on average, a bank downgrade causes a reduction in lending supply. The coefficient of the 
downgrade variable is significant at the 5% level with both the estimation techniques. The upgrade 
dummy variable is not significant, suggesting that a bank upgrade has no impact on loan supply. As 
expected the speed of adjustment coefficient of loans has a small value, suggesting that interventions 
on the loan size take a long time to become effective. Regarding the bank-specific control variables 
(described in Section 3.2), we find that the level of non-performing loans, the net stable funding ratio 
and the level of regulatory capital are no longer significant. Off-balance sheet liquidity that 
materialized on the balance sheet constrained lending adjustment and reduced credit origination as in 
Cornett et al. (2011). Macroeconomic controls appear economically and statistically significant. As 
predicted, the coefficient of the GDP growth variable as a negative and significant sign, while the 
policy rate is significantly positive in line with Osborne et al. (2016).  
Bank liquidity and capital ratios variables enter with a negative and significant sign when 
interacted with policy rates. This suggests that banks with a higher liquidity ratio are more sensitive 
to changes in monetary policy (Cantero-Saiz et al., 2014). Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) 
also find that highly liquid banks tend to hoard liquidity for reasons of precaution rather than lend it 
out. The coefficient of the interaction term between the capital ratio and monetary policy is in line 
with the prediction of Adrian and Shin (2011), Borio and Zhu (2012) and Osborne et al. (2016), which 
emphasized the cyclicality of both leverage and bank willingness to accept risk.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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5.4. Sovereign rating channel  
To further examine the importance of credit rating changes on bank capital structure and 
lending, we ask whether and, if so, how the sovereign risk channel has shaped the relationship. Bank’s 
ratings from Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal experienced a downward pressure during the 
sovereign debt, so we question if the effect of rating changes on capital structure and lending is higher 
for banks from those countries. We quantify the incremental effect using equation (7).  
Table 6 shows the estimates for the two target capital ratios, the variation of risk-weighted 
assets and retained earnings.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
The interaction term coefficient is statistically insignificant in columns (1) and (2), which 
indicates no asymmetric effects on the Tier 1 ratio. There is also no evidence of asymmetric effects 
on risk-weighted assets in column (5) and (6). However, columns (3) and (4) show that treated banks 
tend to increase more the unweighted capital ratio in comparison to non-treated banks. In addition, 
columns (7) and (8) show that the interaction term is positive and significant at 5% level, suggesting 
that treated banks retain more earnings than non-treated banks. We use the same bank and macro 
control variables as in Section 4.1 and we do not find any statistically different sign.  
To examine the incremental impact of downgrades for treated banks on long term funding and 
lending, we estimate equation (7) using the change in long-term funding and lending as dependent 
variables.   
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
As shown in Table 7, treated banks show a higher reduction in long-term funding sources 
following a downgrade. In columns (1) and (2), the coefficients of the interaction terms are negative 
and significant at 10% and 5% level, respectively. We find the same effect on loan changes. Treated 
banks reduced lending more than non-treated banks following a downgrade. We estimate equation 
(7) using three different configurations. In column (3), we run the model without macro controls and 
we find a negative significant coefficient at the 1% level. In column (4,) we add the macro controls 
and we find the same level of significance. In column (5), to further take care of time-varying country 
conditions, we include country-year fixed effects instead of country and time fixed effects. The aim 
is to control for time-varying borrower demand and or quality at the country level and to alleviate the 
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concerns that our results have simply captured changes in the demand for loans (Popov and Van 
Horen, 2015). The significance of the coefficient decreases, but the effect remains statistically and 
economically significant at the 5% level. The bank-specific and macroeconomic control variables in 
columns (3) to (5) are the same used in Section 4.   
Overall, our findings show that the sovereign rating channel increases the impact of bank 
rating downgrades on capital, access to funding and lending supply. Although the results on the 
capital management are mixed, with the insignificant effect on the regulatory capital ratio and the 
level of risk-weighted assets, the impact on long-term funding and loan supply is statistically and 
economically relevant.  
 
6. Placebo test 
The first concern of our investigation is that the incremental effects of rating changes are 
driven by the financial and the European sovereign debt crisis, and thus are not a result of bank rating 
changes. If differences in balance sheet adjustments between treated and non-treated banks are indeed 
driven by the sovereign debt crisis, there should be similar adjustments between the two groups during 
the crisis periods. We control for this issue by performing a placebo exercise. In this first placebo 
exercise we create a crisis dummy with the following characteristics: equal to one in all countries of 
the sample during the financial crisis (period starting from the 3rd quarter 2007 to the end of 2009) 
and equal to one during the sovereign debt crisis (from 2nd quarter of 2010 to the end of 2012) in 
countries that experienced it (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), zero otherwise.   
Table 8 shows that the differences in capital adjustments do not appear during the financial 
and the sovereign crisis without bank downgrades, as shown by the insignificant coefficients of the 
interactions terms (Bank = distressed country *crisis). The coefficient is statistically and 
economically significant only with the Tier 1 regulatory capital, indicating that regulatory leverage 
changes are mainly driven by the EU sovereign crisis. However, in Section 4 we do not find a 
significant effect of the downgrading coefficient on regulatory capital ratios. This reinforces our 
hypothesis that banks have maintained a higher regulatory capital to offset the shocks related to the 
crisis.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
In Table 9 we show the differences in funding and loan supply. As shown, the insignificance 
of the interaction coefficients confirms that the differential effect in funding and lending supply are 
a result of the two crises.  
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[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
To make sure that the sovereign rating channel drives the differences between treated and 
non-treated banks, we implement a second placebo test. In this exercise, we construct a triple 
interaction term. More precisely, we interact the variable Bank = Distressed*Downgrade with a 
dummy variable that takes value one before the sovereign debt crisis (from starting period to the 2nd 
quarter of 2010). The hypothesis that underlines the test is the following: if balance sheet adjustments 
between the two groups of banks are not driven by the sovereign rating channel, there should be a 
significant difference between the two groups in the period prior to the sovereign debt crisis.  
The results of the placebo test shown in Tables 9-10 suggests that the differences between 
treated and non-treated banks do not appear in the period before the sovereign debt crisis. In 
particular, the triple interactions terms are no longer significant for capital adjustment regressions, 
funding and lending supply adjustments. This implies that the sovereign rating channel has driven the 
differences between treated and non-treated banks.  
  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the impact of credit rating changes on bank capital structure adjustments, 
funding decisions and lending. We find that credit ratings affect bank capital structure decisions. 
More precisely, rating downgrades trigger a reduction in leverage, rating sensitive sources of funding 
and lending. On the contrary, rating upgrades do not affect capital structure decisions of banks. In our 
investigation, we also analyse the asymmetric impact on bank rating changes for banks headquartered 
in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain during the sovereign debt crisis. The results suggest an 
economical significant incremental effect of rating changes on banks based on those countries. In 
particular, we find that treated banks reduced leverage, long-term funding and lending more than non-
treated banks following a downgrade. Robustness checks also confirm our results.  
The broad results of our study are consistent with our hypothesis that banks managers are 
concerned with rating-triggered costs (benefits), due to the discrete cost (benefits) associated with 
different credit levels. Our paper supports the view that banks, like non-financial firms, target 
minimum credit ratings. Moreover, we support also the view that public debt management affects 
bank credit ratings through the sovereign ceilings, and not only through fundamentals. When a 
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sovereign experienced a crisis, the downward pressure on its credit rating is transmitted to the 
financial sector; with the consequence of reducing banks’ access to external funding sources and 
ultimately lending supply.  
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Table 1 
Variables definition and summary statistics 
 
This table provides the definition and summary statistics of the variables used in the regressions. The sample consist of 
76 banks corresponding to 3,300 observations during the 2005-2015 period.   
 
Variable Definition Source Mean St Dev Min Max 
Tier 1 Tier 1 capital divided by total 
risk weighted assets  
Bloomberg 0.110 0.030 0.063 0.204 
Equity Total Assets Total Shareholders’ Funds 
divided by total assets 
Bloomberg 0.071 0.033 0.014 0.168 
Roa Return on Assets Bloomberg 0.038 0.130 -0.14 0.054 
Cost income Total overhead costs to the sum 
of net interest income and 
operating income 
Bloomberg 0.647 0.202 0.298 1.76 
NPLs Non-performing loans to total 
loans 
Bloomberg 0.048 0.062 0.009 0.329 
Deposits Total customers’ deposits 
divided by total funding 
Bloomberg 0.596 0.188 0.138 0.858 
LT Debt  Total long-term debt to total 
debt 
Bloomberg 0.168 0.114 0.008 0.509 
Non-Interest Income  Non-interest income to the sum 
of interest and non-interest 
income.  
Bloomberg 0.328 0.177 -0.12 0.823 
Tobin’s q  The ratio of the sum of book 
value of liabilities and market 
value of equity to book value of 
assets. 
Bloomberg 1.013 0.053 0.790 1.468 
RWA  Risk weighted assets to total 
assets 
Bloomberg 0.561 0.219 0.164 1.083 
Off-balance exposure Off balance sheet exposure to 
total assets 
Bloomberg 0.295 0.087 0.002 0.505 
Policy Rates The base rate set by the central 
banks 
Bloomberg 0.0014 0.003 -0.005 0.020 
NSFR The Net Stable Funding Ratio Bloomberg 1.132 0.223 0.381 2.190 
GDP Growth The percentage of GDP growth World  
Development 
Indicators 
0.0093 0.025 -0.09 0.078 
Inflation The percentage change of 
consumer price index 
World  
Development 
Indicators 
0.017 0.014 -0.04 0.048 
 
 
 
 
 68 
Table 2 
Rating changes and capital ratio adjustments 
 
This table shows the Blundell and Bond (1998) and the Fixed Effects estimation results on the effect of rating changes 
on the capital ratio adjustment, for a sample of 76 banks over the 2005-2015 period. In all regressions, we estimate the 
partial adjustment model described in equation (4) using alternatively the BB (1998) and the FE estimator. The target 
capital ratio is Tier 1 capital divided by total risk weighted assets in columns 1 and 3, and the total shareholders’ capital 
divided by total assets in columns 2 and 4. Upgrade (Downgrade) is a dummy variable which takes value one if the bank 
is upgraded (downgraded) in a specific quarter. See Table 1 for variables definitions. All bank-specific explanatory 
variables, as well as the rating changes dummies are one quarter lagged. All specifications control for bank and year fixed 
effects. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 Blundell-Bond  FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Tier 1 Equity 
Total Assets 
Tier 1 Equity 
Total Assets 
Downgrade 0.002** 
(1.92) 
0.001* 
(1.72) 
0.001 
(1.16) 
0.001* 
(1.87) 
Upgrade 0.002 
(0.13) 
-0.002 
(-0.12) 
-0.006 
(-0.41) 
-0.002 
(-0.36) 
Tier 1 0.693*** 
(12.98) 
 0.732*** 
(16.65) 
 
Equity Total Assets  0.668*** 
(13.48) 
 0.745*** 
(20.07) 
NPL 0.027** 
(2.12) 
0.017* 
(1.66) 
0.025** 
(2.23) 
0.015* 
(1.72) 
Roa 0.012 
(0.26) 
0.133** 
(3.21) 
0.009 
(0.19) 
0.104** 
(2.74) 
Deposits 0.008 
(0.94) 
0.021*** 
(3.32) 
0.006 
(0.69) 
0.018*** 
(3.40) 
Cost Income -0.001 
(-0.10) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.001 
(-0.11) 
-0.001** 
(-2.44) 
Non-interest income 0.009* 
(1.88) 
0.006*** 
(3.12) 
0.006 
(1.34) 
0.004** 
(2.02) 
Loans 0.012 
(1.29) 
-0.005 
(-0.06) 
0.009 
(1.13) 
0.005 
(0.97) 
Inflation -0.067 
(-0.94) 
-0.054 
(-1.14) 
0.007 
(0.18) 
-0.027 
(-1.03) 
GDP Growth 0.015 
(0.31) 
0.050** 
(2.02) 
0.011 
(0.36) 
0.049** 
(2.91) 
Tobin Q 0.051** 
(1.99) 
-0.004 
(-0.29) 
0.058** 
(2.81) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
Constant -0.051** 
(-1.93) 
0.009 
(0.54) 
-0.055** 
(-2.44) 
0.0006 
(0.04) U 0.307 0.332 0.268 0.255 
Bank fixed effects YES YES   
Time Fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) 1.30(0.193) 0.32(0.751)   
Hansen P-value 1 1   
R2   0.778 0.940 
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Table 3 
Rating changes risk taking and earnings retentions. 
This table shows the Blundell and Bond (1998) and the Fixed Effects estimation results on the effect of rating changes 
on two different strategies of capital adjustment: risk-weighted asset reduction and earnings retention, for a sample of 76 
banks over the 2005-2015 period. In all regressions, we estimate the partial adjustment model described in equation (4) 
using alternatively the BB (1998) and the FE estimator. The target variable in column 1 and 3 is the level of risk-weighted 
assets over total assets, while in columns 2 and 4 is the level of retained earnings over total assets. Upgrade (Downgrade) 
is a dummy variable which takes value one if the bank is upgraded (downgraded) in a specific quarter. See Table 1 for 
variables definitions. All bank-specific explanatory variables, as well as the rating changes dummies are one quarter 
lagged. All specifications control for bank and year fixed effects. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in 
brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 Blundell-Bond FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 RWA Retained Earnings RWA Retained Earnings 
Downgrade -0.008* 
(-1.78) 
0.002** 
(2.42) 
-0.009** 
(-2.29) 
0.002** 
(2.51) 
Upgrade -0.012* 
(-1.75) 
-0.006 
(-0.45) 
-0.008** 
(-2.27) 
-0.001 
(-1.28) 
RWA 0.832*** 
(17.05) 
 0.667*** 
(11.25) 
 
Retained Earnings  0.704*** 
(16.14) 
 0.810*** 
(22.75) 
NPL -0.011** 
(-1.96) 
-0.019** 
(-2.88) 
-0.076* 
(-1.67) 
-0.017** 
(-3.11) 
Roa 0.092 
(0.96) 
0.056 
(1.31) 
-0.075 
(-0.59) 
0.029 
(1.14) 
Deposits -0.012 
(-0.64) 
0.015** 
(2.07) 
-0.009 
(-0.27) 
0.013** 
(2.78) 
Cost Income 0.0002 
(0.26) 
0.0002 
(1.62) 
0.002* 
(1.68) 
0.0002 
(1.23) 
Non-interest income -0.011 
(-0.87) 
0.001 
(0.69) 
-0.001 
(-0.10) 
0.001 
(0.50) 
Loans 0.111** 
(2.99) 
-0.008 
(-1.07) 
0.199*** 
(3.31) 
-0.017 
(-0.34) 
Inflation 0.020 
(0.17) 
0.076 
(0.99) 
0.088 
(1.15) 
0.044 
(0.90) 
GDP Growth 0.044 
(0.63) 
0.073* 
(1.95) 
0.007 
(0.15) 
0.055** 
(2.09) 
Tobin Q -0.021 
(-0.41) 
0.029** 
(2.72) 
-0.102 
(-1.97) 
0.028*** 
(3.96) 
Constant -0.002 
(-0.04) 
-0.030 
(-1.52) 
0.217 
(3.04) 
-0.032*** 
(-3.98) U 0.168 0.296 0.188 0.19 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Time Fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) 1.25(0.209) 0.01(0.992)   
Hansen P-value 1 1   
R2   0.929 0.936 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70 
Table 4 
Rating changes and long-term funding adjustments 
 
This table shows the Blundell and Bond (1998) and the Fixed Effects estimation results on the effect of rating changes 
on long-term funding, for a sample of 76 banks over the 2005-2015 period. We estimate the partial adjustment model 
described in equation (4) using alternatively the BB (1998) and the FE estimator. The dependent variable is Total long 
term debt to total debt. Upgrade (Downgrade) is a dummy variable which takes value one if the bank is upgraded 
(downgraded) in a specific quarter. See Table 1 for variables definitions. All bank-specific explanatory variables, as well 
as the rating changes dummies are one quarter lagged. All specifications control for country and year fixed effects. P-
values based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 Blundell-Bond FE 
 (1) (2) 
 LT Debt LT Debt 
Downgrade -0.005** 
(-2.56) 
-0.004*** 
(-2.71) 
Upgrade 0.004 
(1.09) 
-0.0007 
(-0.35) 
LT Debt 0.775*** 
(13.99) 
0.688*** 
(6.45) 
NSFR -0.052*** 
(-3.24) 
-0.024* 
(-2.20) 
NPL -0.009* 
(-1.62) 
-0.007** 
(-2.24) 
Roa 0.111* 
(1.91) 
0.094* 
(1.62) 
Equity Total Assets -0.111 
(-1.44) 
-0.023 
(-1.31) 
GDP Growth 0.247* 
(1.89) 
0.238** 
(2.38) 
Policy Rates -0.091 
(-0.23) 
0.463 
(1.53) 
Inflation 0.577** 
(2.56) 
0.530** 
(2.59) 
Constant 0.146*** 
(3.97) 
0.072** 
(2.75) U 0.225 0.176 
Country fixed effects YES  
Time Fixed effects YES YES 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) 1.00(0.316)  
Hansen P-value 1  
R2  0.874 
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Table 5 
Rating changes and lending adjustment 
 
This table shows the Blundell and Bond (1998) and the Fixed Effects estimation results on the effect of rating changes 
on lending adjustment, for a sample of 76 banks over the 2005-2015 period. We estimate the partial adjustment model 
described in equation (4) using alternatively the BB (1998) and the FE estimator. The dependent variable is total loans 
over total assets. Upgrade (Downgrade) is a dummy variable which takes value one if the bank is upgraded (downgraded) 
in a specific quarter. See Table 1 for variables definitions.  NSFR * Policy Rates, NPL * Policy Rates, Tier 1 * Policy 
Rates are the interactions between the NSFR, the level of non-performing loans and the Tier 1 capital and the policy rates, 
respectively. All bank-specific explanatory variables, as well as the rating changes dummies are one quarter lagged. All 
specifications control for country and year fixed effects. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 Blundell-Bond FE 
 (1) (2) 
 Loans   Loans 
Downgrade -0.007** 
(-2.54) 
-0.006** 
(-3.42) 
Upgrade 0.005 
(1.08) 
0.008 
(0.31) 
Loans 0.950*** 
(34.22) 
0.818*** 
(27.31) 
Tier 1 -0.030 
(-0.42) 
0.019 
(0.40) 
NPL -0.002 
(-0.10) 
-0.002 
(-0.60) 
Off-balance -0.004* 
(-1.63) 
-0.002 
(-0.25) 
NSFR 0.015 
(1.48) 
0.004 
(0.83) 
GDP Growth -0.114* 
(-1.65) 
-0.110** 
(-2.59) 
Policy Rates 8.277*** 
(3.43) 
4.13*** 
(3.28) 
NSFR * Policy Rates -3.963** 
(2.49) 
-1.609 
(1.51) 
NPL * Policy Rates -0.358 
(-1.09) 
-0.490* 
(-1.65) 
Tier 1 * Policy Rates -2.720** 
(-2.17) 
-1.96*** 
(-3.23) 
Constant -0.02 
(-0.78) 
0.105*** 
(4.54) U 0.05 0.017 
Country fixed effects YES  
Time Fixed effects YES YES 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) 1.55(0.120)  
Hansen P-value 1  
R2  0.982 
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Table 6 
Rating changes and capital adjustment 
 
This table shows the estimates of model 5 on the effect of a rating downgrade on Tier 1, Shareholder funds to total assets, 
Risk-weighted assets and earnings retention for banks from countries that experienced the sovereign debt crisis. The 
dependent variables in column 1-8 are measured as a percentage change between two quarters. Bank=Distressed country 
* Downgrade is a dummy variable which takes value one if a bank from a specific country that experienced a sovereign 
debt crisis is downgraded in a specific quarter. Bank=Distressed country *Upgrade is a dummy variable which takes 
value one if a bank from a specific country that experienced a sovereign debt crisis is upgraded in a specific quarter. Bank 
controls include: the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans (NPL), the return on assets (Roa), the ratio of deposits 
over total funding (Deposits), the level of overhead costs to total revenues (Cost income), the ratio of non-interest income 
over the sum of non-interest and interest income (Non-interest income), the ratio of total loans over total assets (Loans), 
the ratio of the sum of book value of liabilities and market value of equity to book value of assets (Tobin Q). Macro 
controls include: the percentage change of consumer prices (Inflation), the percentage change of GDP of a certain country 
(GDP growth). All independent variables, as well as the rating changes dummies are one quarter lagged. All specifications 
control for bank and country per year fixed effects. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the 
bank level.   
 
 ∆Tier 1 
∆Equity 
Total Assets 
∆RWA 
∆Retained 
Earnings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bank = Distressed 
country* Downgrade 
-0.0003 
(-0.27) 
-0.0004 
(-0.24) 
-0.0015** 
(-1.92) 
-0.0016*** 
(-3.10) 
-0.010* 
(-1.57) 
-0.012 
(-1.18) 
0.003** 
(2.56) 
0.003** 
(2.11) 
Bank = Distressed 
country* Upgrade 
-0.003 
(-0.27) 
-0.004 
(-1.55) 
0.009 
(0.47) 
0.002 
(1.29) 
-0.003 
(-0.73) 
-0.003 
(-0.47) 
-0.0007 
(-0.45) 
-0.0008 
(-0.45) 
Bank = Distressed  
country 
-0.002 
(-0.67) 
-0.004* 
(-1.99) 
-0.002*** 
(6.69) 
-0.002*** 
(6.64) 
0.014*** 
(7.88) 
0.017*** 
(6.20) 
-0.002 
(-0.68) 
0.005 
(0.17) 
Bank Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Macro Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country x  
Time FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.079 0.129 0.148 0.113 0.064 0.098 0.107 0.245 
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Table 7 
Rating changes, long-term funding and lending supply adjustments 
 
This table shows the estimates of model 5 on the effect of a rating change on long-term funding and lending supply for 
banks from countries that experienced the sovereign debt crisis. The dependent variables in column 1-8 are measured as 
a percentage change between two quarters.  
Bank=Distressed country * Downgrade is a dummy variable which takes value one if a bank from a specific country that 
experienced a sovereign debt crisis is downgraded in a specific quarter. Bank=Distressed country *Upgrade is a dummy 
variable which takes value one if a bank from a specific country that experienced a sovereign debt crisis is upgraded in a 
specific quarter. Banks controls in column 2 include: the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), the ratio of non-performing 
loans over total loans (NPL), the return on assets (Roa), total shareholder’s funds divided by total assets (Equity Total 
Assets). Macro controls in column 2 include: the percentage change of GDP (GDP growth) of a certain country, the base 
rate set by the central banks (Policy rates), the percentage change of consumer prices (Inflation). Bank controls in column 
3-5 include: Tier 1, NPL, Off-balance and the NSFR. Macro controls in column 4-5 include: GDP growth, Policy rates, 
interactions between the NSFR, the level of non-performing loans and the Tier 1 capital and the policy rates. All bank-
specific explanatory variables, as well as the rating changes dummies are one quarter lagged. Specifications in column 1 
and 2 control for bank and country per year fixed effects. In column 3 and 4 control for country and year fixed effects. In 
column 5 for country per year fixed effects. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the bank 
level.   
 
 ∆LT debt ∆Loans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bank =Distressed  
country* Downgrade 
-0.005* 
(-1.83) 
-0.005** 
(-2.37) 
-0.008*** 
(-3.71) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.31) 
-0.007** 
(-2.44) 
Bank = Distressed  
country* Upgrade 
0.002 
(0.58) 
0.003 
(0.77) 
0.003 
(0.82) 
0.003 
(0.91) 
0.005 
(1.07) 
Bank = Distressed  
country 
0.004 
(0.80) 
-0.008 
(-0.90) 
-0.003 
(-0.45) 
0.003 
(0.35) 
-0.006 
(-1.52) 
Bank Controls NO YES YES YES YES 
Macro Controls NO YES NO YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES NO NO NO 
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO 
Time NO NO YES YES NO 
Country x  
Time FE 
YES YES NO NO YES 
R2 0.0751 0.089 0.043 0.058 0.155 
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Table 8 
Rating changes and capital adjustment: placebo shock 
 
This table shows estimates of the effect of placebo periods on Tier 1, Shareholder funds to total assets, Risk-weighted 
assets and earnings retention for banks from countries that experienced the sovereign debt crisis. The dependent variables 
in column 1-8 are measured as a percentage change between two quarters. Bank=Distressed country * crisis is a dummy 
variable which takes value one if a bank from a specific country that experienced a sovereign debt crisis times the crisis 
indicator. Bank=Distressed country *Upgrade is a dummy variable which takes value one if a bank from a specific 
country that experienced a sovereign debt crisis is upgraded in a specific quarter. Crisis is a dummy variable that takes 
value one: during the financial crisis (3rd quarter 2007 to 4th quarter 2009) and in countries that experienced the sovereign 
European crisis in the period starting from 2nd quarter 2010 to 4th quarter 2012. Bank controls include: the ratio of non-
performing loans over total loans (NPL), the return on assets (Roa), the ratio of deposits over total funding (Deposits), 
the level of overhead costs to total revenues (Cost income), the ratio of non-interest income over the sum of non-interest 
and interest income (Non-interest income), the ratio of total loans over total assets (Loans), the ratio of the sum of book 
value of liabilities and market value of equity to book value of assets (Tobin Q). Macro controls include: the percentage 
change of consumer prices (Inflation), the percentage change of GDP of a certain country (GDP growth). All independent 
variables, as well as the rating changes dummies are one quarter lagged. All specifications control for bank and country 
per year fixed effects. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.   
 
 ∆Tier 1 
∆Equity 
Total Assets 
∆RWA 
∆Retained 
Earnings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bank = Distressed 
country* crisis 
0.005** 
(2.86) 
0.005** 
(2.83) 
-0.002 
(-1.06) 
-0.0037 
(-1.55) 
-0.005 
(-1.32) 
-0.006 
(-1.26) 
0.002 
(0.16) 
0.001 
(0.35) 
Bank = Distressed 
country 
-0.002 
(-0.69) 
-0.004** 
(-2.10) 
-0.002** 
(2.25) 
-0.002*** 
(-5.57) 
0.015*** 
(7.37) 
0.018*** 
(6.22) 
-0.0003 
(-0.75) 
-0.001 
(-0.30) 
Crisis -0.003** 
(2.27) 
-0.003 
(-1.54) 
-0.0003 
(-0.25) 
0.0011 
(0.84) 
0.014** 
(2.86) 
0.020** 
(2.75) 
-0.001 
(-1.26) 
-0.002** 
(-2.02) 
Bank Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Macro Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.083 0.127 0.097 0.149 0.066 0.103 0.10 0.248 
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Table 9 
Rating changes, long-term funding and lending supply adjustments: placebo shock 
 
This table shows the estimates of model 5 on the effect of a rating changes on long-term funding and lending supply for 
banks from countries that experienced the sovereign debt crisis. The dependent variables in column 1-8 are measured as 
a percentage change between two quarters. Bank=Distressed country * crisis is a dummy variable which takes value one 
if a bank from a specific country that experienced a sovereign debt crisis times the crisis indicator. Bank=Distressed 
country *Upgrade is a dummy variable which takes value one if a bank from a specific country that experienced a 
sovereign debt crisis is upgraded in a specific quarter. Crisis is a dummy variable that takes value one: during the financial 
crisis (3rd quarter 2007 to 4th quarter 2009) and in countries that experienced the sovereign European crisis in the period 
starting from 2nd quarter 2010 to 4th quarter 2012. Banks controls in column 2 include: the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), 
the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans (NPL), the return on assets (Roa), total shareholder’s funds divided by 
total assets (Equity Total Assets). Macro controls in column 2 include: the percentage change of GDP (GDP growth) of a 
certain country, the base rate set by the central banks (Policy rates), the percentage change of consumer prices (Inflation). 
Bank controls in column 3-5 include: Tier 1, NPL, Off-balance and the NSFR. Macro controls in column 4-5 include: 
GDP growth, Policy rates, interactions between the NSFR, the level of non-performing loans and the Tier 1 capital and 
the policy rates. All bank-specific explanatory variables, as well as the rating changes dummies are one quarter lagged. 
Specifications in column 1 and 2 control for bank and country per year fixed effects. In column 3 and 4 control for country 
and year fixed effects. In column 5 for country per year fixed effects. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown 
in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level.   
 
 ∆LT debt ∆Loans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bank =Distressed 
 country* Crisis 
0.003 
(0.35) 
0.002 
(0.11) 
0.003 
(1.07) 
0.005* 
(1.86) 
-0.003 
(-0.47) 
Bank = Distressed  
Country 
-0.004 
(-1.57) 
-0.010*** 
(-4.59) 
-0.008 
(-1.23) 
-0.003 
(-0.37) 
-5.81 
(-1.38) 
Crisis -0.006* 
(-1.28) 
-0.012** 
(-3.31) 
-0.003 
(-0.36) 
-0.004** 
(-2.15) 
0.002 
(0.38) 
Bank Controls NO YES YES YES YES 
Macro Controls NO YES NO YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES NO NO NO 
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO 
Time FE NO NO YES YES NO 
Country x Time FE YES YES NO NO YES 
R2 0.083 0.112 0.03 0.038 0.103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76 
Table 10 
Rating changes and capital adjustment: differences prior the sovereign debt crisis 
 
This table shows estimates of the effect of placebo periods on Tier 1, Shareholder funds to total assets, Risk-weighted 
assets and earnings retention for banks from countries that experienced the sovereign debt crisis. The dependent variables 
in column 1-8 are measured as a percentage change between two quarters. Bank=Distressed country * downgrade*pre-
EU Crisis is a dummy variable which takes value one if a bank from a specific country that experienced a sovereign debt 
crisis has been downgraded prior to the EU sovereign crisis. Bank=Distressed country is a dummy variable which takes 
value one if a bank from a specific country that experienced a sovereign debt crisis. Bank controls include: the ratio of 
non-performing loans over total loans (NPL), the return on assets (Roa), the ratio of deposits over total funding (Deposits), 
the level of overhead costs to total revenues (Cost income), the ratio of non-interest income over the sum of non-interest 
and interest income (Non-interest income), the ratio of total loans over total assets (Loans), the ratio of the sum of book 
value of liabilities and market value of equity to book value of assets (Tobin Q). Macro controls include: the percentage 
change of consumer prices (Inflation), the percentage change of GDP of a certain country (GDP growth). All independent 
variables, as well as the rating changes dummies are one quarter lagged. All specifications control for bank and country 
per year fixed effects. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.   
 
 ∆Tier 1 
∆Equity 
Total Assets 
∆RWA 
∆Retained 
Earnings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bank = Distressed 
country* downgrade* 
pre-EU crisis 
0.002 
(0.80) 
0.0006 
(0.18) 
-0.001 
(-0.15) 
-0.0009 
(-0.79) 
-0.0009 
(-0.15) 
-0.005 
(-0.61) 
0.002 
(1.42) 
0.007 
(0.24) 
Bank = Distressed 
country 
-0.002 
(-0.65) 
-0.004** 
(-2.01) 
-0.002*** 
(4.65) 
-0.002*** 
(-5.74) 
0.014*** 
(7.63) 
0.018*** 
(6.21) 
-0.0003 
(-0.72) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
Bank Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Macro Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country x  
Time FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.078 0.12 0.109 0.148 0.062 0.103 0.102 0.242 
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Table 11 
Rating changes, long-term funding and lending supply adjustments:  
differences prior the sovereign debt crisis 
 
This table shows the estimates of model 5 on the effect of a rating changes on long-term funding and lending supply for 
banks from countries that experienced the sovereign debt crisis. The dependent variables in column 1-8 are measured as 
a percentage change between two quarters. Bank=Distressed country * downgrade*pre-EU Crisis is a dummy variable 
which takes value one if a bank from a specific country that experienced a sovereign debt crisis has been downgraded 
prior to the EU sovereign crisis. Bank=Distressed country is a dummy variable which takes value one if a bank from a 
specific country that experienced a sovereign debt crisis. Banks controls in column 2 include: the net stable funding ratio 
(NSFR), the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans (NPL), the return on assets (Roa), total shareholder’s funds 
divided by total assets (Equity Total Assets). Macro controls in column 2 include: the percentage change of GDP (GDP 
growth) of a certain country, the base rate set by the central banks (Policy rates), the percentage change of consumer 
prices (Inflation). Bank controls in column 3-5 include: Tier 1, NPL, Off-balance and the NSFR. Macro controls in column 
4-5 include: GDP growth, Policy rates, interactions between the NSFR, the level of non-performing loans and the Tier 1 
capital and the policy rates. All bank-specific explanatory variables, as well as the rating changes dummies are one quarter 
lagged. Specifications in column 1 and 2 control for bank and country per year fixed effects. In column 3 and 4 control 
for country and year fixed effects. In column 5 for country per year fixed effects. P-values based on robust standard errors 
are shown in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank level.   
 
 ∆LT debt ∆Loans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bank = Distressed 
country* downgrade* 
pre-EU crisis 
-0.010 
(-0.81) 
-0.011 
(-0.79) 
-0.009 
(1.54) 
-0.006 
(-1.00) 
-0.007 
(-1.59) 
Bank = Distressed 
Country 
0.005 
(0.83) 
-0.007 
(-0.79) 
-0.006 
(-0.89) 
0.002 
(0.30) 
-0.695 
(-1.63) 
Bank Controls NO YES YES YES YES 
Macro Controls NO YES NO YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES NO NO NO 
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO 
Time NO NO YES YES NO 
Country x  
Time FE 
YES YES NO NO YES 
R2 0.096 0.111 0.03 0.036 0.102 
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Appendix A.  
Number of banks for each country and frequency of rating downgrades and upgrades.  
 
Country N. Banks N. Downgrades N. Upgrades 
Austria 2 4 2 
Belgium 1 3 2 
Cyprus 1 3 0 
Denmark 2 5 2 
Finland 1 1 1 
France 5 10 6 
Germany 4 8 4 
Greece 4 21 10 
Ireland 3 14 6 
Italy 10 54 9 
Netherlands 3 7 3 
Portugal 2 11 2 
Slovenia 1 3 0 
Spain 7 33 15 
Sweden 3 3 6 
Switzerland 2 5 2 
UK 5 14 6 
US 20 52 33 
Total 76 251 109 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of bank risks on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy for 
a sample of 149 US banks over the period from 2007 to 2016. Using quarterly balance sheet data and 
employing a GMM approach to deal with endogeneity, I document that bank risk positions are 
relevant for the transmission mechanism through the bank lending channel during the FED 
Quantitative easing (QE) programmes. I conclude that QE programs helped banks to supply new 
loans through the reduction of bank risk conditions, as perceived by financial market investors. These 
results are relevant for the way monetary policy was conducted in response to the financial crisis, 
since QE programmes were effective in reducing the heterogeneous transmission of the monetary 
policy in the US.   
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper explores the importance of bank risk conditions in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy during conventional and unconventional monetary policy interventions for a panel 
of 149 US banks over the period from 2007 to 2016.  
Traditional conceptualization of the bank lending channel (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; 
Kashyap and Stein, 1995) are based on the ability of central banks to directly manipulate the level of 
deposits through their control of bank reserves and the money multiplier mechanism. The underlying 
mechanism is the following: monetary policy tightening causes a fall in deposit that forces banks to 
substitute deposits with more expensive forms of market funding, with the result of contracting loan 
supply. The examination of the traditional framework suggests that bank access and cost of market 
based funding sources is not relevant for the transmission mechanism. 
However, financial innovation and the higher reliance of banks to wholesale funding sources 
have increased the importance of banks’ access to external financing in the functioning of the bank 
lending channel. Financial system changes have led to a new theoretical framework (Bernanke, 2007; 
Disyatat, 2011) in which the bank lending channel works primary through the impact of monetary 
policy on banks’ external finance premium as determined by their balance sheet strength. The main 
hypothesis of the new theoretical framework is that monetary tightening leads to a rise in the price of 
funding liquidity, which constrains lending activities. Banks’ cost of funds is sensitive to their 
underlying financial health, thus riskier or banks in poorer conditions have to pay a risk premium on 
their uninsured deposits. The risk premium constraints banks’ access on external financing and 
ultimately limit asset expansion and loan growth.  
The financial crisis has made very clear that the perception of risk by financial markets is 
crucial to banks’ access to finance. Following, the eruption of the crisis only banks with strong capital 
positions and higher reliance on stable funding sources were able to maintain their lending activities 
(Cornett et al., 2011), while liquidity dried for banks with a higher proportion of market based funding 
sources. The liquidity constraints, the inability to access to new freshly funding sources due to the 
higher balance sheet risks and the exceptional monetary policy interventions have made relevant the 
investigation on how investors’ perception of bank risks influence the effectiveness of unconventional 
monetary policy interventions.  
The importance of bank risk positions on the transmission mechanism in an environment with 
conventional monetary policy interventions is investigate in Altunbas et al. (2010), for a sample of 
EU banks. In this paper, I take a step further as I analyse the effect of unconventional monetary policy 
that are likely to change the relationship. Unconventional monetary policy interventions in response 
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to the crisis, may have drastically reduced the importance of bank risk in the provision of new loans. 
QE programs helped banks to restore their lending activities by influencing both the supply and 
demand side of loans. On the supply side, QE reduces financing costs for banks through lower 
depository rates and higher value of assets on the balance sheet. While on the demand-side, it 
increases consumer demand through a wealth effect due to improvement in asset prices. In respect to 
this, the observation of the effect of QE programs on bank balance sheets give rise to the following 
research questions: Did QE helps riskier banks to reduce funding constraints and ultimately sustain 
their lending activities?  
My investigation is related on a growing literature on the impact of unconventional monetary 
policy on bank lending behaviour. Previous works have shown that the Fed QE programs led to higher 
loan growth (Chakraborty et al., 2016) and risk taking within banks’ loan portfolio (Kandrac and 
Schluche, 2016). My work takes a different perspective, as it shed light on the effect of bank risks on 
the transmission mechanism of QE programs. Specifically, I analyse if QE programs alleviates 
funding constrains of risky banks and ultimately support the production of new loans for those banks. 
To do so I use a dataset of US bank balance sheet items and banks’ risk positions over the period 
2007 to 2016 at quarterly frequencies. The estimation is performed using a similar approach of 
Altunbas et al. (2010). To tackle endogeneity problems from the interactions between bank risk and 
monetary policy, I use a GMM system with robust standard errors as suggested by Blundell and Bond 
(1998).  
I achieve two main results that demonstrate the effects of the QE programs on lending. First, 
I show that bank risk positions matter for the supply of new loans. Then, I demonstrate that riskier 
banks have benefited more of the QE programs to support their lending activities. However, 
unconventional monetary policy actions have also a negative effect on bank profitability. Since QE 
reduces long-term yields, lending to deposit interest rate spreads fall making harder for banks 
generate interest income on new loans. This negative effect may hamper the effectiveness of the 
interventions. I also control for this effect and I find that the results remain virtually unchanged. In 
particular, bank’s risk positions, together with the monetary policy interactions remain unchanged. 
Basically, I do not find evidence of a net interest income channel at work that could reduce the 
effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy interventions in US. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the literature. 
Section 3 and 4 describes the data and the methodology, respectively. Section 5 and 6 presents the 
empirical results and robustness checks. The last section summarises the main conclusions.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
My work is related to two different strands of literature. More specifically, my empirical 
investigation is related to recent works on the effect of quantitative easing QE programs on the bank 
lending channel ant to the literature on the effect of bank characteristics on the bank lending channel.  
Most of the literature on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy through the bank 
lending channel focuses on environments with positive policy rates and standard monetary policy 
interventions. After the massive FED and ECB interventions in response of the global financial crisis, 
the literature has started to devote attention on the effect of large scale asset purchases from different 
perspective. Morais et al. (2017) provide evidence of credit supply spillovers from US and European 
banks to Mexico after Quantitative Easing (QE) interventions, while Di Maggio et al. (2017) looks at 
the re-financing and consumption choices. Kandrac and Schulsche (2016) assess the effect of QE on 
lending and risk-taking. The authors find that QE leads to higher loan growths and more risk taking 
within loan portfolios. Rodnyansky and Darmouny (2017) shows that banks with a large fraction of 
Mortgage Back Securities on their balance sheet expand lending more aggressively after QE1 and 
QE3 interventions.  
A large number of studies have analysed the response of lending to shifts in monetary policy, 
depending on bank-specific characteristics. A tight in monetary policy causes a drop-in deposit 
(Drechsler et al., 2015, Choi and Choi, 2017), that forces banks to rely on other external funding 
sources. Raising external debt financing is difficult for banks with weak balance sheets, so their 
lending is more sensitive to monetary shocks. In this regard, bank balance sheet is measured in terms 
of capital, funding composition, liquidity, size and credit risk.  
Bank equity capital plays part in the provision of new loans, owing to the existence of 
regulatory capital constraints and imperfect competition in the market for bank-fund raising. The 
recent empirical literature (Carlson et al., 2013; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Osborne et al., 
2016) shown a cyclical relationship between bank capital and lending, i.e. the relationship is stronger 
during periods of credit contraction and weaker during credit expansion. One of the possible 
explanations relates to the cyclical mechanisms on bank decision making that have emerged since the 
financial crisis. As risk measures tend to vary pro-cyclically (Borio and Zhu, 2012), bank willingness 
to accept risk exposure increases during periods of rapid expansion and decreases during credit 
contractions. Therefore, banks during the pre-crisis period, operated with low levels of capital and 
accepted relatively high portfolio risks. Then, during the financial crisis the same banks needed to 
reduce leverage and portfolio risk. Moreover, Carlson et al. (2013) also shown that the elasticity of 
bank lending with respect to capital ratios is higher for banks with capital ratios near the minimum 
 83 
regulatory requirements, suggesting a nonlinear effect of capital ratios on bank lending. Further, 
funding composition plays a role on the provision of loans. There is a closer connection between the 
conditions in the financial markets and banks’ ability to raise funds from wholesale funding sources. 
Consequently, the reliance on those funding sources makes banks’ incentive and ability to lend 
sensitive to investors’ perceptions and overall financial market conditions. This means that the 
transmission of monetary policy depends on the funding composition of the banking sector. Ivashina 
and Scharfstein (2010) and Cornett et al. (2011) demonstrate that banks cut less lending during the 
global financial crisis if they were less dependent on short-term debt.  
In addition to funding composition, exposures on off-balance sheet loan commitments plays 
a role in the provisioning on new loans. According to Kashyap et al. (2002) demand deposits and loan 
commitments offer to bank customers a similar service: liquidity on demand to accommodate 
unpredictable needs. Indeed, in a loan commitment, the borrower has the option to take the loan on 
demand over some specified period of time; therefore, loan commitments can turn to loans at any 
time when the borrower chooses to withdraw funds. Berger and Bouwman (2009) finds that half of 
the liquidity creation at commercial banks occurs through committed credit lines. Thus, banks should 
consider loan commitments in their liquidity risk practices and their management should impact the 
production of new loans. Moreover, monetary policy effects are different under a commitment 
relative to loans not made under a commitment. Morgan (1998) note that bank loans not made under 
a commitment slow after monetary policy tightening, while loans under commitment accelerate or 
remain unchanged.  
Bank size also matters. Size proxies for a few sources of heterogeneity in the banking sector. 
The perception of bank credit risk depends on the size of the bank. Market participants perceive 
systemic banks as too-big-to fail and thus less risky than the smaller counterparts. Moreover, larger 
banks have an easier access to alternative funding sources to finance their lending activities, thus are 
less sensitive to monetary policy changes.    
Finally, Altunbas et al. (2010) suggests that bank risk conditions need to be considered among 
the other balance sheet indicators. According to the authors, banks with lower default probabilities 
are better able to protect their loan supply activity from monetary policies and external shocks.  
 
3. Empirical model  
 
To test the hypotheses, I propose the following dynamic model:  
 ∆9]/X_-,5 = 6∆9]/X_-,5AB + 	8u-,5AB + K#[<	#;X<_5AB ∗ u-,5AB + ""$5AB ∗ u-,5AB + W5B + G-,5		(1) 
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The dependent variable ∆9]/X_ measures the growth rate in loan supply for bank 1 in quarter 2 relative to quarter 2 − 1 scaled by total assets. The vector u-,5AB represent the (lagged) five bank 
specific variables that I identify in the discussion of the literature: (1) capital, (2) deposit funding, (3) 
loan commitments, (4) asset size, (5) bank risk position. The first four bank specific variables are 
expressed in the following way: capital is the fraction of shareholders’ funds to total assets, deposit 
funding is the ratio of total costumers’ deposits over total assets and assets size is the logarithm of 
total assets.  
The fifth bank-specific variable is the bank risk position, identified with two risk variables: 
the loan loss provision as a percentage of total assets (LLP) and the Bloomberg credit risk measure. 
The LLP is a standard ex-post accounting measure of credit risk (Altunbas et al., 2010). The second 
variable is the Bloomberg 1-year ahead expected default probability, which is a forward-looking 
indicator of credit risk computed by Bloomberg professional service using financial and market data. 
The methodology used by Bloomberg to estimate the 1-year ahead expected default probability is an 
improvement of the Merton distance to default model16. The bank specific covariates are interacted 
with both the conventional (#[<	#;X<_5AB) and the unconventional (""$5AB) monetary policy 
indicators. The interaction coefficients capture the effect of monetary policy changes in the supply of 
credit. Finally, the specification also includes time fixed effects W5B to control for loan demand shifts.   
The analysis performed in this paper are affected by endogeneity issues. Monetary policy 
affects credit supply of banks, but the situation of the banking sector can influence monetary policy 
as well. Moreover, monetary policy affects banks’ funding composition as well. A central bank 
increase in interest rates causes a drop on deposits (Drechsler et al., 2015; Choi and Choi, 2017), that 
causes a substitution of deposits with wholesale funding sources. To deal with endogeneity concerns, 
I use the one step system GMM with robust standard errors (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In the 
estimation, I use the second and third lags of interaction variables as instruments in the level equation 
and the second and third lags of the bank-specific covariates as instruments in the difference equation.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
16 For further methodological details see Bloomberg Credit Risk DRSK white paper on the Bloomberg professional 
service terminal.  
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4. Data 
  
The data used in this paper is from Bloomberg professional service. I first select all active 
banks headquartered in the United States. There were 1040 individual banks active in 2016Q3. I 
exclude all foreign-controlled banks and banks not subject to the Trouble Asset Relief Program 
(TARP), which leaves a sample of 251 banks. Further, I exclude banks with no balance sheet data for 
at least 4 years. The final sample consist of 149 individual banks.  
I collect detailed financial information for all banks in the final sample at quarterly frequencies 
for the period 2007Q1 – 2016Q4. In particular, I collect balance sheet information on bank assets, 
deposits, capital and off-balance sheet loan commitments. I start from 2007 because default 
probabilities started to rise between 2007Q3 and 2009Q3 with the eruption of the global financial 
crisis. The period of analysis contains the three QE programs conducted by the Fed. More precisely, 
the timeline of the unconventional monetary policy interventions is the following. In November 2008, 
the Fed started the first QE program with securities purchases beginning in the following month. By 
the end of the first quarter of 2010 the first QE program had concluded, however due to the 
weaknesses of the U.S. economy the Fed Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced a new large-
scale asset purchase program on November, 3, 2010. In September 2012 FOMC meeting announced 
a third QE program that ultimately ends in October 2014.  
To measure conventional monetary policy actions, I use the official Fed funds target rate as 
in Choi and Choi, (2017) and Drechsler et al. (2015) among others. The Fed funds target rate set by 
the Federal Open Market Committee is, on my opinion, a better measure of the stance of conventional 
monetary policy than the three-months Libor rate, used in Borio and Gambacorta (2017); because the 
latter is also influenced by developments in liquidity risk in the interbank market. For unconventional 
monetary policy, I use the shadow short rate as developed in Krippner (2013a; 2013b). The shadow 
short rate reflects the effects that unconventional monetary policy actions have on the term structure 
of interest rates (Pericoli and Taboga, 2015). Using the shadow short rate instead of the central bank’s 
balance sheet volume, as a proxy for measuring the effect of unconventional monetary policy actions, 
as the advantage of evaluating the different impact of different unconventional policy actions on the 
term structure of interest rates. However, the estimation of the shadow short rate is particularly 
difficult and have been so far only estimated with approximate methods. In this paper, I use the 
methodology developed in Krippner (2013a; 2013b) and I estimate the shadow short rate with the 
MATLAB code provided by the author.  
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
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5. Results 
 
Table (3) presents the main results of the paper. The equations have been estimated using the 
GMM estimator. The results of the estimations passed both the AR (2) and the Sargan test. This 
confirms, respectively, that there is no second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals 
and that the instruments are valid.  
Column 1 reports the estimates of the baseline regression (1). Column 2 shows the estimates 
of the baseline model, with a triple interaction to analyse the incremental effect of bank risk position 
for riskier banks on the supply of new loans. Column 3 reports the estimates of the baseline model in 
column 1 with an additional interaction to control for the pro-cyclicality of the risk measures. 
The coefficients of the bank specific covariates demonstrate that the riskiness of the bank 
portfolio has a negative effect on the ability of banks to provide lending. Other things being equal, 
higher loan-loss provision (LLP) reduces profits and capital, thus the variable have a negative effect 
on lending supply. A similar and higher effect is detected for the Bloomberg default risk variable. 
The results suggest that bank risk position matter for the supply of new loans. As indicated, 
Bloomberg default risk is a forward-looking measure of credit risk that includes market perceptions 
of banks’ credit risk. In this respect, there is evidence that investors are sensible to credit risk, thus a 
higher Bloomberg default risk limits the ability of banks to rise external funds. As a result, for riskier 
banks it would be difficult to raise public equity or debt in capital markets. In this respect, the 
empirical evidence shows that US investors in bank’s debt are sensitive to bank risk (Flannery, 2001; 
Goyal, 2005). More precisely, the sensitivity is analysed for subordinated debt instruments and the 
results suggests that it would be difficult for riskier banks issue uninsured debt to finance their lending 
activities.      
Moving to the other bank specific covariates and their interactions. I observe a statistically 
negative effect for commitment credit lines, reflective of the takedown demand of funds that move 
from off-balance to on-balance sheet accounts. This negative sign indicates that banks more exposed 
to pre-existing commitments tend to drop total credit production for liquidity risk management 
purposes. However, the coefficients of the interactions between commitment credit lines and both the 
conventional and unconventional monetary policy indicators are not statistically significant.  
As expected, the interaction terms of capital, deposits and size with the fed fund rates have 
positive signs. In line with the bank lending channel literature, well capitalized banks with stable 
funding sources are better able to offset conventional monetary policy changes (Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli, 2004; Cornett et al., 2011; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). The interactions of capital and 
size with unconventional monetary policy measures (SSR) have the negative expected sign, while for 
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deposits the coefficient is not significant. The results are consistent with my expectations: also during 
unconventional monetary policy tools strong capitalized banks are better able to expand their lending 
activities.  
I also analyse the effect of monetary policy on lending relative to the overall level of bank’s 
risk. The interactions between the Bloomberg credit risk and the Fed funds rates indicates that the 
transmission of conventional monetary policy is not sensitive to banks’ risk position. The result is in 
contrast with the findings of Altunbas et al. (2010), who find that the transmission mechanism is less 
effective for riskier European banks. For the transmission mechanism under unconventional 
monetary policy, I find, as expected, a statistically significant negative sign of the interaction between 
the Bloomberg credit risk indicator and the shadow short rate. The sign of the coefficient suggests 
that the transmission of unconventional monetary policy measures is more effective for riskier banks. 
Thus, riskier banks have benefited more of the quantitative easing programs to support their lending 
activities.  
I confirm this result in column 2 with two triple interaction terms:  b3]]gZ[fY	@[a/;32	f1_k5AB ∗ #[<	a;X<_ ∗ ℎ1Yℎ	=1[3< to measure the sensitivity of lending 
supply to conventional monetary policy changes of non-investment grade banks, and b3]]gZ[fY	@[a/;32	f1_k5AB ∗ ""$ ∗ ℎ1Yℎ	=1[3< to measure the sensitivity of lending supply to 
unconventional monetary policy changes of non-investment grade banks. The coefficient ℎ1Yℎ	=1[3< 
is a dummy variable which takes value one for banks classified non-investment grade in the 
Bloomberg credit risk measure17. The sign of the coefficient of the first triple interaction remains 
statistically insignificant, while the coefficient of the second is positive and statistically significant. 
The magnitude and the significance of the latter coefficient further proofs our assertion that riskier 
banks have benefited more of the quantitative easing programs to support their lending activities.  
The effect of bank risk on lending may be different over the business cycle due to the diverse 
market perception of risk. Moreover, the loan loss provision could be used as a discretionary tool to 
smooth earnings over time (Cornett et al., 2009). Therefore, I have introduced two additional 
interaction terms in column 3. Firstly, I interact the growth rate in nominal GDP with the Bloomberg 
default risk measure and the loan loss provision. The idea is the following: if the market perception 
of risk is lower during expansionary phase of the cycle and vice versa during downturns as suggested 
in Borio et al. (2001), the coefficient of the interaction term would be negative. For the second 
interaction, I expect that banks that set aside provision during expansionary periods, are better able 
to absorb losses and thus they can continue their lending activity. The results displayed in column 2 
                                                
17 The Bloomberg credit risk measure is a transformation of the Bloomberg one year ahead default probabilities on a 
rating scale. Non-investment grade banks are those with a default probability higher than 0.5200%.  
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of Table (3) indicate that the interaction term of the loan loss provision with the business cycle 
indicator is positive and statistically significant, while the interaction of the Bloomberg default risk 
measure with the business cycle indicator is negative and not statistically significant. Other 
coefficients remain roughly unchanged. The positive sign of the interaction, suggests that banks that 
set aside provision in positive states of the economy, would been in a better position to absorb 
portfolio losses during downturns and continue their lending activities.  
 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
6. Controlling for the existence of a “net interest income channel” 
 
Conventional monetary policy changes (i.e. reduction in interest rates) are typically associated 
with an increase of the yield curve and an increase in net interest income, which amplifies the 
transmission mechanism. On the contrary, unconventional monetary policy measures entail a 
flattening of the yield curve, which erodes future profitability and impairs the effectiveness of 
monetary policy measures on banks; especially those more exposed on loan activities. To this issue, 
Borio and Gambacorta (2017) indicates that monetary policy is less effective in a low interest rate 
environment, owing to a different behaviour of capital-constrained banks and heterogeneity in bank 
risk. Given the effect of unconventional monetary policy on net interest income, I assume that the net 
interest income channel could shape the relationship between lending supply and bank risk. If this 
assumption is true, I would expect a reduction of the significance and the magnitude of the 
coefficients measuring bank risk position when testing for the net interest income channel.  
To test the net interest income channel, we modify equation (1) in the following way:  
 ∆9]/X_-,5 = 6∆9]/X_-,5AB + 	8u1,2−1 + K#[<	#;X<_2−1 ∗ u1,2−1 + ""$2−1 ∗ u1,2−1 +!111,2−1 +																														!111,2−1 ∗ #[<	#;X<_2−1 + !111,2−1 ∗ ""$2−1 + W21 + G1,2		(2)  
 
Where: !11 is the ratio of net interest income to total assets, which measures the contribution 
of the net interest income to the formation of the return on assets. !11-,5AB ∗ #[<	#;X<_5AB and 	!11-,5AB ∗ ""$5AB are the interaction of the net interest income with the Fed funds and the shadow 
short rate, respectively.  
The results of the estimation are shown in table (3). For equation 2, I use the same estimation 
procedure of equation 1. More specifically, I rely on the same lags for instruments in the level and in 
the difference equation.  
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[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
I find that the estimated coefficients remain virtually unchanged. In particular, bank risk 
position variables together with the monetary policy interactions remain roughly unchanged. This 
result suggest that the net interest income channel do not shape the relationship between credit supply 
and bank risk during both conventional and unconventional monetary policy changes. For the 
interactions of the net interest income over total assets (!11) with the fed funds rates and the shadow 
short rates, I do not find a statistically significant sign relationship. The result is in contrast with the 
empirical findings of Albertazzi et al. (2016) for European banks and Borio and Gambacorta (2017) 
for a sample of international banks.  
Part of this could be explained by the reduction of borrowing costs that boosted the net interest 
margin.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The higher reliance on alternative funding sources have made banks more sensible on market 
perception of credit risk. The increase of investors’ perception of bank risks during the financial crisis 
has severely hit banks with larger shares of market base funding on their balance sheets. In response 
to these weaknesses in the banking sector and with the aim of restoring liquidity and reducing market 
uncertainty, central banks around the world started large asset purchase programs. The 
unconventional monetary policy interventions helped banks to access to external funds through the 
reduction of market risk premia of uninsured deposit funding. In this paper, I analyse how bank risk 
positions influences bank credit supply following unconventional monetary policy interventions. 
Using a sample of US banks over the period 2007 to 2016, I find that bank risks plays an important 
role in the transmission mechanism of QE programs. More precisely, I demonstrate that riskier banks 
have benefited more of the QE programs to support their lending activities. To further enhance my 
results, I also control for the “net interest income channel” and I find that the results remain roughly 
unchanged.  
My results provide important policy implications. Firstly, I show that the impact of monetary 
policy actions can be both amplified or attenuated depending on investors’ market perceptions of risk 
of the banking sector. Secondly, the results suggest that, especially during stress periods, a close 
coordination between central bank monetary policy and supervisory activity is required with the aim 
of increasing the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism through the bank lending channel 
(Altunbas et al., 2010).  
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Table 1 
Variables definition and summary statistics 
 
This table provides the definition and summary statistics of the variables used in the regression. The sample consist of 
149 banks corresponding to 3373 observations during the 2007-2016 period.  
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Loans to Total Assets Net loans divided to total assets 0.690 0.105 0.153 0.80 
Commitment credit lines The ratio of loans under 
commitment to total assets 
0.358 0.271 0.111 0.99 
Capital Total Shareholders’ Funds divided 
by total assets 
0.071 0.033 0.014 0.168 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets 3.485 0.826 1.746 6.997 
Deposits Total customers’ deposits divided by 
total funding 
0.878 0.087 0.382 0.942 
Bloomberg Default Risk Bloomberg 1-year ahead default 
frequencies 
0.422 0.265 0.111 0.987 
LLP The ratio of loan loss provision over 
total assets 
0.003 0.003 0.001 0.31 
Fed funds  0.008 0.015 0.0012 0.052 
SSR The shadow short rate -0.953 2.443 -4.12 5.04 
GDP The level of GDP growth 1.37 2.57 -8.2 5 
Unemployment The level of unemployment 6.995 1.837 4.5 9.93 
Nii The ratio of net interest income over 
total income 
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Table 2 
Regression results 
 
This table shows the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimation results of equation 1, for a sample of 149 over the 2007-2016 
period. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3)  
∆Loanst-1 0.092** 
(2.07) 
0.061 
(1.40) 
0.093** 
(2.09) 
 
Bank characteristics     .]gg12g[X2	cf[<12	31X[_5AB -0.084** 
(-2.04) 
-0.069* 
(-1.69) 
-0.084* 
(-2.02) 
 ./012/35AB 0.007 
(0.13) 
0.011 
(0.22) 
0.008 
(0.17) 
 "1~[5AB -0.054** 
(-2.05) 
-0.043* 
(-1.69) 
-0.55** 
(-2.07) 
 @[0]_12_5AB -0.281 
(-0.97) 
-0.165 
(-0.58) 
-0.28 
(-0.96) 
 b3]]gZ[fY	@[a/;32	f1_k5AB -0.023*** 
(-4.97) 
-0.019*** 
(-5.71) 
-0.023*** 
(-4.90) 
 995AB -0.067*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.069*** 
(-2.34) 
-0.067*** 
(-2.65) 
 
Interactions     .]gg12g[X2	cf[<12	31X[_5AB ∗ #[<	#;X<_ -0.655 
(-0.13) 
-0.51 
(-1.07) 
-0.644 
(-0.13) 
 ./012/35AB ∗ #[<	#;X<_ 0.078** 
(1.93) 
0.071** 
(1.85) 
0.076** 
(1.87) 
 @[0]_12_5AB ∗ #[<	a;X<_ 0.660*** 
(2.60) 
0.355* 
(1.69) 
0.665*** 
(2.62) 
 "1~[5AB ∗ #[<	a;X<_ 0.077*** 
(3.26) 
0.049** 
(2.21) 
0.077*** 
(3.30) 
 b3]]gZ[fY	@[a/;32	f1_k5AB ∗ #[<	a;X<_ -0.772 
(-0.84) 
 
 
-0.687 
(-0.75) 
 .]gg12g[X2	cf[<12	31X[_5AB ∗ ""$ -0.005 
(-0.32) 
0.003 
(0.14) 
-0.005 
(-0.30) 
 ./012/35AB ∗ ""$ -0.034** 
(-1.88) 
-0.037** 
(-1.94) 
-0.034** 
(-1.90) 
 @[0]_12_5AB ∗ ""$ -0.025 
(-0.19) 
-0.046 
(-0.34) 
-0.028 
(-0.21) 
 "1~[5AB ∗ ""$ -0.017* 
(-1.65) 
-0.020* 
(-1.83) 
-0.018* 
(-1.56) 
 b3]]gZ[fY	@[a/;32	f1_k5AB ∗ ""$ 0.003** 
(2.02) 
 
 
0.004** 
(2.05) 
 b3]]gZ[fY	@[a/;32	f1_k5AB ∗ #[<	a;X<_ ∗ ℎ1Yℎ	=1[3<  -0.244 
(-0.65) 
  b3]]gZ[fY	@[a/;32	f1_k5AB ∗ ""$ ∗ ℎ1Yℎ	=1[3<  0.003** 
(2.40) 
  ∆Ä@ ∗ b3]]gZ[fY	@[a/;32	f1_k5AB   -0.006 
(-0.61) 
 ∆Ä@ ∗ 995AB   0.014* 
(1.78) 
 
Time Dummies  YES YES YES  
AR (1) 0.000 0.000 0.000  
AR (2) 0.198 0.336 0.181  
Sargan Test  0.559 0.093 0.585  
N. of observations 3373 3373 3373  
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Table 3 
Regression results of the “net interest income channel” 
 
This table shows the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimation results of equation 2, for a sample of 149 over the 2007-2016 
period. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆Loanst-1 0.091** 
(2.08) 
0.090** 
(2.07) 
0.098** 
(2.40) 
Bank characteristics    .]gg12g[X2	cf[<12	31X[_5AB -0.078** 
(-1.94) 
-0.081** 
(-2.01) 
-0.075** 
(-1.89) ./012/35AB -2.369 
(-1.24) 
-2.436 
(-1.28) 
-2.957 
(-1.30) "1~[5AB -0.048** 
(-1.88) 
-0.048* 
(-1.85) 
-0.053*** 
(-2.10) @[0]_12_5AB -0.217 
(-0.78) 
-0.217 
(-0.76) 
-0.270 
(-1.03) b3]]gZ[fY	@[a/;32	f1_k5AB -0.22*** 
(-5.08) 
-0.022*** 
(-4.81) 
-0.216*** 
(-5.33) 995AB -0.076*** 
(-3.11) 
-0.076*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.073*** 
(-2.94) 
Interactions    .]gg12g[X2	cf[<12	31X[_5AB ∗ #[<	#;X<_ -0.55 
(-0.12) 
-0.392 
(-0.08) 
-1.00 
(-0.23) ./012/35AB ∗ #[<	#;X<_ 0.099** 
(2.06) 
0.092** 
(1.91) 
0.078* 
(1.59) @[0]_12_5AB ∗ #[<	a;X<_ 0.61** 
(2.47) 
0.615** 
(2.49) 
0.592*** 
(2.72) "1~[5AB ∗ #[<	a;X<_ 0.073*** 
(3.12) 
0.076*** 
(3.21) 
0.071*** 
(3.52) b3]]gZ[fY	@[a/;32	f1_k5AB ∗ #[<	a;X<_ -0.859 
(-0.99) 
 -0.430 
(0.55) .]gg12g[X2	cf[<12	31X[_5AB ∗ ""$ -0.009 
(-0.54) 
-0.009 
(-0.57) 
-0.009 
(-0.59) ./012/35AB ∗ ""$ -0.069*** 
(-3.26) 
-0.068*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.064*** 
(-3.23) @[0]_12_5AB ∗ ""$ -0.016 
(-0.13) 
-0.018 
(-0.14) 
-0.069 
(-0.59) "1~[5AB ∗ ""$ -0.016* 
(-1.50) 
-0.016 
(-1.47) 
-0.021** 
(-1.92) b3]]gZ[fY	@[a/;32	f1_k5AB ∗ ""$ 0.004** 
(2.30) 
 0.004*** 
(2.40) b3]]gZ[fY	@[a/;32	f1_k5AB ∗ #[<	a;X<_ ∗ ℎ1Yℎ	=1[3<  -0.556 
(-1.01) 
 b3]]gZ[fY	@[a/;32	f1_k5AB ∗ ""$ ∗ ℎ1Yℎ	=1[3<  0.003** 
(2.22) 
 
Net interest income Channel    !11 2.365 
(1.23) 
2.433 
(1.28) 
2.945 
(1.30) !11 ∗ #[<	a;X<_ -2.640 
(-0.65) 
-2.427 
(-0.59) 
1.243 
(0.91) !11 ∗ ""$ 0.35 
(1.38) 
0.036 
(1.41) 
0.213 
(0.59) !11 ∗ #[<	a;X<_ ∗ ./012/35AB   -0.124 
(-1.15) !11 ∗ ""$ ∗ ./012/35AB   0.006 
(0.24) .]X_2/X2 0.200 
(0.47) 
-2.885** 
(-2.80) 
-2.459** 
(-2.64) 
 95 
Time Dummies  YES YES YES 
AR (1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR (2) 0.183 0.165 0.136 
Sargan Test  0.472 0.484 0.720 
N. of observations 3373 3373 3373 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
